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Abstract 
 
With the proliferation of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs), manufacturing processes have 
improved over the last 30 years, however, the organizational focus to securely exchange and 
process information to/from integrated systems has been consistently lacking. These environments 
continue to be susceptible to security vulnerabilities, despite history [15] showing that 
cybersecurity exposures in manufacturing have largely gone unaddressed and continue to rise [52]. 
This study evaluates cybersecurity challenges in the industry and proposes recommendations for 
practical and fiscally responsible defense-in-depth cybersecurity protections for manufacturing 
environments. 
 
The business operating model, how ICSs became pervasive, as well as the major components that 
enable the operational technology (OT) were evaluated. With an understanding of the traditional 
network architecture for the industry [37], the rapidly evolving challenges facing the industry were 
examined. These challenges are impactful to the traditional and slow to change manufacturing 
operating model that has not focused on the necessary cyber protections for their OT environments. 
In addition, the industry is now facing game-changing technological concepts such as advanced 
manufacturing and Industry 4.0 that bring new complex challenges and cyber threats, unfamiliar 
to most in the industry. This is all underpinned by an organizational divide where the personnel 
most knowledgeable with the modern technology and cyber risks, in the majority of cases, are not 
responsible for the OT architecture and security.  These headwinds impact an industry which 
spends the least on IT and cyber security than any other industry, globally [22]. 
 
The cyber risks and challenges in the industry are diverse, spanning technological and 
organizational competencies, stemming from purpose built components which operate in an 
ecosystem where cybersecurity is an afterthought. As a means to close the gap, practical and 
 xi 
 
reasonable recommendations to address these problems are discussed; some specific and unique 
to the manufacturing industry while others are fundamental applications discussed with a 
manufacturing industry lens, which are commonly ignored due to perceived complexity, cost or 
simply lack of awareness. Lastly, a number of these recommendations were selected for further 
evaluation and implementation; challenges, approach, benefits and outcomes are shared showing 
measureable improvements to the cybersecurity posture of the organization. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Modern manufacturing has entered a digital renaissance where factories are requiring reinvention 
to address changes in customer demand, increased global competition, and organizational 
constraints. Companies are evolving, not only to expand and gain market share but in some cases, 
to simply maintain an existing customer base in a highly competitive global business climate. 
While the traditional manufacturing sector has characteristics similar to other evolving industries 
being revolutionized by “digital everything”, there are significant complex and unique differences. 
These organizations historically focus on ways to drive continuous improvement and investment 
through what are considered traditional methods (e.g. process optimization, lean factory, etc.). 
Manufacturing companies are now being forced to invest in information technology (IT) and 
cybersecurity efforts in a manner that is new and unfamiliar to the manufacturing vertical; to 
address the digital divide as it expands in an industry that is slow to change and adapt. 
 
I have focused my career in leading organizations to develop effective and efficient IT solutions 
across multiple different subject matter areas, with my primary focus on infrastructure services. 
For the last eight years, I have worked for a global five billion-dollar industrial manufacturing 
firm; at the onset of my tenure, I was amazed by the lack of attention that the operational 
technology (OT) environment received from an IT controls and cybersecurity perspective. As I 
began to address these issues, I was introduced to suppliers and customers who had similar issues, 
many of which were from smaller organizations. In learning about their difficulties regarding 
abilities to provide reasonable and prudent OT cybersecurity services, I conducted additional 
research about these problems within the industry. I came to realize that this is a systemic problem 
across the industrial manufacturing vertical that is not getting enough attention given the 
magnitude of short- and long-term potential impacts. Thus the focus of this research. 
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Recently, I attended an industry roundtable event hosted by the manufacturers alliance for 
productivity and innovation (MAPI) in conjunction with the Indiana University School of Public 
and Environmental Affairs. Approximately 40 senior leaders responsible for IT/OT strategy and 
operations within the manufacturing industry attended the roundtable. The purpose of this 
roundtable was to explore critical issues being faced by the manufacturing industry such as, 
artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), technical standards, cybersecurity, and privacy 
to determine if there was a path via a public policy initiative to improve and modernize the 
manufacturing vertical for these game-changing critical capabilities. Through this discussion, it 
became even more visible that cybersecurity in manufacturing is an area that lacks proper levels 
of awareness, attention, and degree of understanding to drive change and institute fundamental 
cyber protections. Surprisingly, the majority of the concerns surrounded the perception that in 
order to provide adequate cybersecurity protections, sophisticated and expensive tools, as well as 
third-party services, were by default a necessity. As I explored this topic further with the group, it 
became apparent that many firms are uninformed and unaware that reasonable protections can be 
instituted by performing basic, fundamental tasks aligned with traditional IT industry best-
practices. Through this discussion, I was able to confirm the validity of my initial hypothesis for 
my thesis; with additional research and education, that there are material improvements that can 
be gained by defining a set of practical recommendations, focusing on improving OT cybersecurity 
in within the manufacturing industry. 
 
The primary focus of this research examines how this industry is approaching these new business 
problems, namely cybersecurity for smart factories. IT-enabled factories are at the center of many 
of these innovations, where stakes are high and protection of people, systems, and information are 
of paramount importance. Beyond the inherent business need(s) that an organization must solve 
for, measures must be implemented to protect against nefarious individuals who want to gain 
access in order to exploit the organization in some manner. Ideally, OT organizations would 
implement the recommendations of the International Electrotechnical Commission Standard for 
Industrial Automation and Control Systems, IEC-62443 [18], as well as the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework (CSF) [7], providing a well-rounded, yet aggressive stance to digital protections for 
any manufacturing organization. The reality is that most manufacturing companies cannot afford 
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the initial and ongoing investment (people, time, and money) and downtime to implement the 
breadth and depth contained within IEC-62443 and the NIST CSF. The research and 
recommendations presented herein strive to provide a practical approach to assess and implement 
the measures that can address these modern risks, considering realistic constraints in a hyper-
competitive and under-invested arena. 
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Chapter 2: Overview of Manufacturing and the Cybersecurity Landscape 
 
Within the manufacturing sector, the convergence of OT and IT in real-time within the 
manufacturing industry is known as smart manufacturing. By comparing traditional manufacturing 
to SM, a better understanding of how manufacturing companies operate will be established. The 
new and pressing challenges, which will push modern manufacturing organizations into becoming 
digitally driven, will then be explored.  
 
2.1. Traditional Manufacturing 
In order to understand the unique cybersecurity challenges being faced by a modern manufacturing 
organization, it is important to understand traditional manufacturing principles. 
Traditional manufacturing is simply defined as transforming raw materials into finished goods by 
some chemical or mechanized process [54]. There are a handful of key factors that differentiate 
the traditional manufacturing industry, not only from other verticals, but also from advanced 
manufacturing characteristics. For the purposes of this research, these concepts are not explored 
in depth, only summarized below in order to provide a base level of understanding. 
 
Raw Material – At the core of manufacturing is the raw material that is required for the creation 
of the product. Whether the products being manufactured are finished goods, ready for end user 
consumption/use or components downstream in a complex supply chain, investment in raw 
material is at the core of manufacturing. In modern manufacturing, retaining the correct amount of 
raw material is key so that enough is on hand to create the necessary product. However, the 
material should not be sourced too early, as that would deplete or lessen an organization’s financial 
position. An efficient, accurate and responsive supply chain is key to this delicate balance. 
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Inventory Levels – Manufacturing organizations must maintain some degree of inventory or 
safety stock in order to ensure that customer demand can always be met, even in uncertain 
situations where supply chain issues may arise. Forecasts are created that depict demand and 
production planning personnel ensure that the necessary product is available whether it be just-in-
time or long-lead time items. Retaining too much inventory hinders an organization’s working 
capital, while not maintaining enough inventory can lead to delays in meeting customer demand 
and the potential for loss of business. 
 
Customer Demands – Depending on the business in question, meeting customer demand for 
manufactured product can fall into one of two categories. Within the first category, variance in 
customer requirements is very low and mass production is acceptable, provided normal order 
volumes can quickly turn into realized sales. These are typically commodity products that are 
expected to be directly used with a known use profile and a clear understanding of the consumer’s 
expectations. Products can be produced in mass and placed into inventory well in advance of 
committed orders. In the second category, manufactured components are purpose built or custom 
engineered for specific use and conform to a high degree of customer variability. In this category, 
products are manufactured to the requirements of a specific customer demand. 
 
Labor – In a traditional manufacturing organization, labor is typically the number one variable 
cost component of the goods sold. In 2012 a study by Kronos Incorporated, conducted by 
International Data Corporation (IDC) Manufacturing Insights, it was noted that across most first 
and second world countries, the manufacturing industry was the single most important industry as 
a driver for economic health [41]. Additionally, labor productivity was the main driver for success. 
Firms within a manufacturing vertical traditionally focus on training and continuous improvement 
as methods to minimize waste and increase productivity. 
 
Compute Interfaces and Data – The advent of the integrated circuit chip allowed for 
manufacturing efficiencies to be exploited through supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA), as well as ICS technologies. SCADA and ICS allow hardware and software solutions 
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to be interconnected and monitored. The resulting data can then be gathered for further analysis, 
instrumentation, processing and automation in a real-time manner within a manufacturing facility. 
 
2.2 Brief History of Manufacturing Origins and Industrial Control Systems 
Industrial control systems were first developed to automate and control the states of analog 
devices. The first known use case of an ICS system can be traced back to the ancient Egyptian 
inventor Ctesibius who created a water clock in 250 B.C. that was much more precise than other 
methods at the time [8]. This invention is an example of feedback control, which is a simple type 
of ICS. Ingenuity and innovation continued as advancements in science and mathematics in the 
1600s and 1700s facilitated the concepts of feedback loops, closed loops and control systems. This 
led to the development of many items, such as thermostats, steam engines and other purpose-built 
devices [15]. Much of 1800s’ advancements built on the ideas of the men and women before them, 
iterating to create improved analog solutions. In the 1800s, significant progress was made in 
electricity, electromagnetic theory and conduction. These advancements led to controlling 
temperature, pressures and liquid levels for industrialized needs, such as hydraulic, pneumatic, and 
steam systems. These systems drove further advancements that ultimately led to the creation the 
first relay logic-based systems that laid the foundation for the advent of modern ICS architecture.  
 
2.3 Architecture 
ICS can take on different forms depending on the design requirements and the approach of the 
system integrator who is designing and building the solution. While there may be different design 
approaches, the majority of ICSs have the same core components. In order to understand the 
opportunities for improvement related to cybersecurity, it is important to understand these core 
components. 
 
2.3.1 Major Components of an ICS 
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) – SCADA systems allow for large 
distributed measurements of control systems, centralized at a larger scale. Manufacturing 
organizations are no longer relegated to individual, distributed PLCs. Instead, SCADA can now 
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collect, communicate, report and control across a system of networked PLC functions at scale [20]. 
SCADA allows for hardware and software solutions to be interconnected so that data can be 
monitored and collected for further analysis, instrumentation, processing, and automation in real-
time. 
 
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) – With the new capabilities enabled by SCADA systems, there 
was a need to aggregate all of the systems for oversight and management purposes. Thus, RTUs 
were purpose built as highly resilient architectures to prevent SCADA systems from being 
negatively impacted. RTUs are traditionally deployed in remote locations and are equipped with 
wireless radio interfaces (wireless LAN, microwave, etc.) to support situations where remote wired 
communications are unavailable [57]. 
 
Programmable Logic Computer (PLC) – PLCs are microchip devices that monitor and control 
instruments using the input/output of instruments, sensors, actuators, motors, etc. PLCs were first 
used in the manufacturing industry in the 1960s in order to automate the changing of switches, 
sensors and control relays required to swap out different types of sheet metal. The automotive 
industry was booming and drove this requirement as the potential for different body materials 
increased [15]. PLCs have since evolved into sophisticated devices with the capability of directing 
complex processes used largely in SCADA and distributed control systems (DCSs). In SCADA 
environments, PLCs are less inexpensive and more adaptable than special-purpose RTUs [15]. 
 
Distributed Control System (DCS) – A DCS is a set of computerized systems that consists of 
geographically distributed controls within a factory. A DCS differs from a SCADA system in that 
a SCADA is a single controller located centrally, but in a DCS environment, each process or 
machine is managed by a dedicated controller [60]. 
 
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) – The need for third party bolt-on components acting as 
makeshift RTUs across multiple disparate SCADA architectures resulted in the industry creating 
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new a standard. The International Society of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
introduced a designation for IEDs, which consisted of an independent power system, a 
microprocessor and a communications port [15]. The IED was developed as an intelligent 
sensor/actuator that could obtain data, communicate with other devices and perform local 
processing [21]. An IED combines multiple inputs, outputs, controls and communication 
mechanisms in one device. 
 
Data Historian – A data historian is a utility application that acts as a central database for 
aggregating all the information from an ICS. Information can be accessed to support different 
needs, from statistical analysis to enterprise resource planning (ERP) functions [57]. 
 
Human Machine Interface (HMI) – The HMI is a combination of software and hardware that 
allows factory operators to monitor the manufacturing processes and override operations in an 
emergency. The HMI displays process status information as well as historical information and 
reports for operators, administrators and other authorized users. HMIs can take on many different 
forms based on the use case. For example, an HMI could be a dedicated PC in a control center, a 
laptop connected via a wireless network or a browser on any system connected to the network [21]. 
 
Sensor – A sensor is a component of a larger subsystem, which detects a change in state or 
condition based on the variables in its environment. Upon noting a change in state (e.g. 
temperature, vibration, direction, etc.), a sensor will send a signal to a control system, such as a 
PLC or an RTU, for further analysis and determination of the next action, if any. 
 
Actuator – An actuator is a component of a machine that is responsible for moving and controlling 
another component, mechanism or system. Actuators generally require a control signal and a 
source of energy to facilitate mechanical motion. 
 
 9 
 
Remote Station – A remote station is a collection of sensors, actuators and control systems (PLC 
or RTU), which are dedicated to a specific purpose or function. A typical manufacturing operation 
will have numerous remote stations across a single operation. 
 
Control Server – The control server executes PLC supervisory control software that accesses 
downstream control modules over an ICS network. 
  
SCADA Server or Master Terminal Unit (MTU) – The SCADA server is the component that 
acts as the master control server in a SCADA system. Remote stations, RTUs and PLC devices 
typically report status, conditions and other information to these systems. SCADA servers act as 
brokers or as interfaces between upstream and downstream components within the ICS, as shown 
in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1: SCADA system implementation example [40] 
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Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) System – An ERP system is a software application that 
leverages a database to manage and control important business processes as part of an operation. 
An ERP system traditionally covers multiple business functions, such as planning, purchasing, 
inventory, sales, finance and human resources. 
 
Manufacturing Execution System (MES) – An MES is the wide-ranging platform that controls 
all the events within the manufacturing operation. Processing with an MES begins with orders 
from customers, planning and coordination of back office functions and the master schedule. From 
there the MES plans and drives the processes required in order to build the products in the most 
effective, low cost, practical and high-quality way. Functions that reside in most MES systems 
include, but are not limited to, scheduling, shop floor control, inventory tracking/management, 
material movement, maintenance management, time and attendance, costing, quality, document 
management, product lifecycle/data management, configurators, routings, engineering change 
control and supply chain management. MESs typically integrate into ERP systems for holistic 
management of the shop floor and business operations. 
 
In a modern manufacturing environment, each of these components, as shown in Figure 2, are 
required to efficiently and effectively operate a manufacturing operation. 
 
 
Figure 2: High-level architecture hierarchy of a manufacturing environment 
ERP
MES
SCADA Systems
Control Systems (PLCs)
Input/Output Control Hardware 
(Sensors, Actuators, etc.)
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2.3.2 Network Components 
ICS environments can be architected with different components and connection mediums tailored 
to the specific needs of the engineered solution. Many traditional ICS environments use fieldbus 
networks to locally connect sensors/actuators to PLCs or RTUs, however, with IT influencing OT, 
modern connection methods have bridged these two ecosystems. While this has improved 
efficiency, lowered costs, and met customer needs, it has also caused a significant increase in 
security vulnerabilities exposed to the shop floor. Part of this study will discuss these attack 
vectors, the origins, and what can be done to protect manufacturing environments going forward 
without significantly impacting availability and efficiency. In order to discuss these topics, the 
major components of a typical ICS network must be understood. 
 
Fieldbus Network - The fieldbus network interconnects sensors, actuators and other devices to a 
PLC, RTU or other microprocessor-based controller. Similar to traditional IT networks, fieldbus 
technologies eliminate the need for point-to-point cabling between the controller and each device. 
The devices communicate with the fieldbus controller using a variety of protocols, many of which 
are proprietary. 
 
Control Network - The control network connects the higher-level components, such as the data 
historian, HMI and SCADA-MTUs to lower level control modules, such as remote stations, PLCs, 
sensors and actuators.  
 
Remote Access Points - Remote access points are the entry/interface points of a control network 
for remotely accessing and configuring control systems on the Local Area Network (LAN). This 
can be in the form of laptops, mobile devices (tablets, mobile phones, etc.) or purpose-built 
terminals. The core trait is that access is granted remotely to the control system.  
 
Router - A router is a communication device that sends packets (electronic data) between two 
networks. In a manufacturing environment, this includes, but is not limited to, LAN-to-WAN, 
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MTU-to-RTU and long-distance communications across WANs for remote site SCADA 
communications. 
 
Firewall - A firewall segments and protects devices on a network by filtering, monitoring and 
controlling packets using predefined policies based on source, destination, port/protocol, 
application/service and authenticated user 
 
Modems - A modem is a communications device used to connect remotely to a computer or similar 
device over traditional telephone circuits. Modems are often used in SCADA systems to enable 
long-distance serial communications between MTUs and remote field devices, where high-speed 
WAN connections are not available or are too expensive. Modems are also used in SCADA 
systems, where gaining remote access for operational diagnostic and maintenance functions is 
necessary [50]. 
 
2.4 Traditional Network Segmentation Model for Manufacturing 
Historically, manufacturing networks do not have the same architectural design and security-
minded approach as enterprise or corporate networks. This is often a by-product of IT and OT 
being managed by entirely separate departments. For instance, manufacturing environments are 
built out of necessity by engineers looking to achieve a specific constraint-based outcome, rather 
than from an IT and cybersecurity best-practice perspective. Thus, it is not uncommon to find 
manufacturing networks with fundamental issues, such as unsegmented flat networks, a lack of 
firewalls implemented, and third-party equipment vendors with uncontrolled access to the 
manufacturing network. 
 
In the 1990s, Theodore Williams and members of the Industry-Purdue University Consortium 
for Computer Integrated Manufacturing developed the Purdue enterprise reference architecture 
(PERA) model, as shown in Figure 3. PERA was assembled specifically for the manufacturing 
industry in order to address the human and organizational aspects of an enterprise, from planning 
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to operations. PERA is unique, as it considers both facility engineering and IT in a comprehensive 
enterprise-wide model for discreet and process manufacturing [37].   
 
 
Figure 3: PERA sitewide network architecture [37] 
 
As shown in Figure 3 above, levels 1 through 3 within the PERA model are comprised of 
components on the factory floor where the manufacturing process control functions reside. Level 
1 consists of sensors and actuators, level 2 consists of PLCs and RTUs, which ingest the data from 
the sensors and level 3 consists of HMI devices, which control the processes being executed and 
measured. All components located on level 3 and below reside on a dedicated industrial/control 
network. Level 4 consists of the manufacturing management processes and related devices. 
Typically, the manufacturing execution system (MES) processes are located on level 4, including 
maintenance-scheduling, quality, raw material management, and reporting functions. Level 4 sits 
between the industrial network and the site’s LAN for general back office functions. Level 5, 
within the site LAN, contains processes and related devices that perform functions such as 
engineering, finance, human resources, shipping and order processing. Level 6 is connected to the 
site LAN and represents all connectivity to other company offices, commonly via a WAN (MPLS, 
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site-to-site VPN tunnels, etc.), where other upstream- or downstream-dependent functions reside 
as part of a larger distributed enterprise organization [37]. 
 
2.5 Advanced Manufacturing 
Advanced manufacturing carries with it the foundation of traditional manufacturing concepts, 
however, it focuses on accelerating manufacturing practices through state-of-the-art applications 
of science, technology, processes, product design, and production [54]. A core belief in the 
advanced manufacturing world is that the competitive advantage will be held by those who 
innovate, adopt, and leverage technology at a continually increasing rate. Those who fail to 
embrace advanced manufacturing will be irrelevant, and thus will be relegated to niche 
products/markets, will succumb to an acquirer, or will simply go out of business. As shown in 
Figure 4 below, research conducted by Camoin Associates in a 2011 study compared key 
characteristics of conventional and advanced manufacturing [10]. While there were parallels 
affecting productivity between traditional and advanced manufacturing, every component in 
advanced manufacturing relied on technology.  
 
 
Figure 4: A comparison between conventional manufacturing and advanced manufacturing [10] 
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In a survey by IDC, the top three factors affecting the global manufacturing landscape were 
training, continuous improvement and investment in technology [41]. This investment in 
technology is not only a necessity in modern manufacturing, but it is the singular key enabler for 
relevance in a highly competitive space. Technology affects traditional manufacturing in 
immeasurable ways. Customers can now visualize 3D-printed scale models at the front end of a 
sales cycle. AI and ML can provide numerous real advanced insights such as visual quality 
inspection variances and predictive indicators regarding factory conditions. Advanced robotics can 
work alongside or in-lieu of human labor and augmented reality can be used to visualize designs 
or assist in numerous factory operations from stock room picking to advanced research and 
development. Technology is influencing how customers partner with firms to solve highly 
complex problems in every industry. It is also affecting how human capital evolves, for instance, 
from a utility-based model to a knowledge-based model on the shop floor. Manufacturing 
companies will continue to evolve at a new organizational pace as technology improves at a 
rapidly.  
 
On June 24, 2011, President Barack Obama spoke at Carnegie Mellon University and initiated the 
Advanced Manufacturing Partnership (AMP). This was an industry-driven, national effort and a 
key component of the U.S. government’s plan to further develop manufacturing opportunities and 
stave off the recent decline of manufacturing jobs in the country. This initiative involved the 
government, private industry and academia to identify the prevailing issues and the most impactful 
opportunities to improve technologies, processes and products across multiple manufacturing 
industries [42]. The focus on investing in advanced manufacturing has provided a renaissance of 
sorts to an aged and slowly evolving industry, which has been attempting to capitalize on a range 
of new opportunities. The opportunities all share a common constraint, which is the most important 
component of advanced manufacturing – the availability of a skilled, technology-enabled 
workforce. “The integration of technology and advanced machinery diminishes the need for 
‘unskilled’ workers and increases the reliance on workers with the sophisticated skills required to 
operate the equipment. Advanced manufacturing training courses and programs in community 
colleges, technical schools, and even K-12 education systems are essential to supporting growth 
in the advanced manufacturing sector” [10]. 
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Advanced manufacturing is an area receiving significant attention, especially outside of the United 
States. Germany is leading the charge with a federally-funded 2006 initiative, Industrie 4.0, where 
the aim is to lead industry-integrated solutions by 2020 with a target to increase productivity levels 
by 50% [12]. China is a close second with the Made in China 2025 initiative, which began in 2015. 
Its objective was to transform China into the global advanced manufacturing leader [27]. Both 
governments are heavily investing in this area, because of the value that digitally-enabled 
manufacturing will bring to local economies. In 2014, the United States followed suit and began 
the Manufacturing USA program to organize industry, university and government partners to 
grow U.S. manufacturing competitiveness and promote a sustainable national manufacturing 
research and development platform [28]. The U.S. program has been slow to evolve, as it aims to 
partner with private industry rather than push targets from the top-down, as it is done in other 
countries. 
 
2.6 Industry 4.0 
Advanced manufacturing is enabled and advanced by an ever-evolving world of interconnected 
objects. These interconnected objects interface with each other over a global footprint of 
technologies over traditional and modern mediums including LANs, WANs and cloud-based 
services. This manufacturing-based, automated information exchange is evolving, however, there 
are a few key components that make up such a system. Below is a sampling of the prevalent 
components receiving attention and being invested in today. 
 
Internet of Things - At the core of Industry 4.0 is the IoT. IoT is the concept that every device, 
as basic or sophisticated as it may be in its normal, intended form, can be enhanced by technology 
to interface and communicate with other internetworked components. The advancements and 
additional innovations that can be made once these components are internetworked are seemingly 
endless. Within the manufacturing space, the industrial internet of things (IIoT) is a subset of the 
IoT, where large numbers of networked devices connect with each other to establish systems that 
can monitor, aggregate, share, analyze, and convey valuable information, which was previously 
unattainable or extremely complex and expensive to gather. At its peak, in a high functioning IIoT 
landscape, autonomous manufacturing becomes a reality, and robots either replace or supplement 
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the labor traditionally handled by humans. IIoT is commonly associated with industries, such as 
oil and gas, power generation, and healthcare, where unintended interruptions can cause life-
threatening or high-risk situations [9]. Conversely, the IoT tends to represent consumer-level, 
convenience-based devices, which do not carry life threatening or significant monetary 
repercussions. 
 
Cyber-Physical Systems – A cyber-physical system (CPS) is a solution, where physical hardware 
and software are deeply intertwined. The unique, independent components with different behaviors 
interact with each other in multiple ways. CPS involves approaches from multiple disciplines, such 
as mechatronics, cybernetics and embedded systems. Examples of CPSs are autonomous 
automobiles, medical monitoring systems, advanced robotics, and autopilot systems. CPS is 
thought of a higher functioning architecture built on top of dependent IoT components [34]. 
 
Cognitive Computing – Cognitive computing (CC) incorporates the disciplines of artificial 
intelligence and signal processing. The technology mimics the functions of the human brain. It is 
adaptive, context aware, stateful, iterative, and interactive. CC traditionally contains components 
from machine learning, natural language processing, object recognition, reasoning, human-
computer interaction, and narration [19].  
 
Cloud Computing – Cloud computing is the concept that computing resources (compute, storage, 
memory, networking, etc.) can be provisioned and shared across multiple distinct entities. This 
provides economies of scale, which results in more readily accessible resources, quicker data 
processing (generally) and a reduction in the overhead to operate and maintain compute clusters. 
Rather than investing financial capital upfront, cloud computing uses an expense-based model 
where users can pay as the services are rendered. Most cloud services leverage a scale-out model, 
where smaller, denser servers are leveraged and can be easily added to as demand increases. 
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2.7 Information Technology vs. Operational Technology 
The promise of smart manufacturing is considerable from an economic impact perspective. In a 
2017 study by CapGemini Consulting, it was estimated that SM would add between $500 billion 
and $1.5 trillion in positive economic impact within the next five years [38]. While the potential 
of SM is tremendous, there are a significant number of issues, both technical and non-technical, 
that virtually all manufacturing organizations are facing. Specifically, the differences between IT 
and OT and how the related characteristics and organizational biases clash must be addressed for 
the benefits of SM to be realized. These factors in many cases have a direct impact on the 
organization’s cybersecurity posture and exacerbate the problem, at times unnecessarily. 
Additionally, the business needs and approach are different enough to cause other downstream 
problems (skills, cost, process, etc.). As an example, in a 2012 interview of decision makers at 39 
different North American utility companies, improving the IT/OT integration was a higher priority 
than planning for smart grid initiatives [14]. While there are parallels in IT and OT security, having 
a mature OT security posture is typically more critical, as the practices are used to protect people 
and assets involved in monitoring and controlling devices, processes and actions rather than simply 
data and information. In order to understand how to establish a set of recommendations to close 
the cybersecurity gaps within an OT setting, the differences between IT and OT must first be 
defined; see Table 1. 
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Table 1: IT vs. OT 
 IT OT 
Purpose Manage information, automate business processes 
Manage (physical) assets and events, control 
plant processes 
Culture Adapts to frequent change, anticipates newer technology 
Accustomed to long useful life, change requires 
significant testing  
Focus User experience, data and services, confidentiality, integrity, availability Safety, reliability; people, environments 
Success 
Targets 
User satisfaction, budget compliance, on time 
delivery 
Consistent solutions, longevity of solutions, 
deterministic outcomes, high fault tolerance 
Architecture Transactional, relational database management system (RDBMS), publishing or collaboration 
Event-driven, real-time, embedded software, 
rule engines 
Solutioning 
Approach 
Assess requirements, develop standards, 
buy/build at lowest cost, plan for upgrades and 
support 
Leverage vendor solutions / previous examples, 
optimize for performance and use 
Interfaces Web browser, PC, keyboard/mouse Sensors, coded displays 
Custodians Chief Information Officer (CIO), infrastructure, application professionals Engineers, technicians, plant managers 
Connectivity Corporate network, IP-based, web-based, mobile, wireless, cloud-enabled 
Control networks —increasingly IP-based, 
wireless 
Security 
Compliance 
Imperative at all levels as part of a defense-in-
depth strategy, harden everything inside the 
network and on the edge 
Seen as an interference to manufacturing 
processes, leave the manufacturing network 
alone, however, secure the edge 
Examples ERP, supply chain management (SCM), CRM, email, online banking, collaboration, etc. 
SCADA systems, PLCs, HMIs, control 
systems, monitoring tools 
 
When assessing the cybersecurity impact on core technology characteristics, there are also key 
differences further emphasizing how OT must be treated differently. Table 2 below has been 
assembled to map OT characteristics and their related impacts on cybersecurity. The impact that 
the OT characteristics have on cybersecurity planning and design will enable business operations, 
yet protect the data and devices involved in the OT processes. 
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Table 2: OT characteristics and impact on cybersecurity 
 OT Characteristic Impact on Security 
Default System 
Parameters 
OT devices ship from OEMs with default 
configurations, which allow the device to 
operate in most environments without 
specialized configuration customization. 
Default settings are typically not hardened or 
secured. There is a lack of hardening 
configurations, which can lead to access to 
default credentials, unnecessary open 
services, etc. 
System 
Monitoring 
OT systems are often monitored externally by 
specialized vendors and OEMs in order to 
maintain and certify tight control parameters. 
The security perimeter needs to be designed 
and controlled with OT equipment vendors. 
External client VPN, persistent access to OT 
devices, etc. are all potential access methods 
required for manufacturing environments. 
Latency 
"Real-time" latency in the OT world refers to 
sub-millisecond responses compared to 
milliseconds in the IT world. 
Controls intended to protect the environment, 
such as firewalls, virus-scanning products, 
etc. typically increase latency, thus potentially 
affecting OT operations. 
Availability 
In a manufacturing environment, it is not 
uncommon for an organization to run 
multiple shifts, even 24x7x365 (outside of 
any preventative maintenance cycles).  
The requirements for high availability creates 
challenges in the timing of patches, updates, 
vulnerability scanning, etc. A high level of 
coordination and planning is required to meet 
the business’s needs. 
Asset 
Lifecycle 
Within a manufacturing setting, it is not 
uncommon to have machinery and its related 
specialized computing equipment used for 
upwards of 15 to 20 years. 
Software/firmware are often out of date well 
beyond a reasonable level. IT/OT teams need 
to implement a regular maintenance 
procedure in order to maintain a reasonable 
security posture. 
Incompatibility 
With Security 
Software 
In many cases, OT related devices are 
designed in a closed architecture, due to 
concerns with regulations, human safety and 
intellectual or proprietary property. 
Additional security agents, clients or tools 
(e.g. anti-virus software, client firewall) 
cannot be used to protect the devices. IT/OT 
organization should look to implement 
compensating controls, where possible. 
 
 
As shown in Figure 5 below, in a 2017 survey by Gartner, 350 executives were asked to rank the 
top three challenges that organizations faced when aligning IT with OT systems. The top challenge 
was Division between IT and Operations, followed by Fear of security implications and Risk to 
processes/equipment integrity [58]. 
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Figure 5: Top challenges executives faced when aligning IT with OT systems [58] 
 
Understanding these different paradigms allows focus to be placed on the actions necessary to 
optimize both IT and OT in order to develop a model to improve the overall cybersecurity posture 
of the organization.  
 
2.8 IT Spend for Manufacturing Organizations 
Financial investment is a key driver for any organizational capability. IT and cybersecurity are no 
different, especially with technology evolving as frequently as every 12-18 months. In a 2016 
study conducted jointly between Deloitte and the manufacturers alliance for productivity and 
innovation [62], 225 executives were interviewed regarding cyber-risk in advanced manufacturing. 
From the responses, it was determined that only 52 percent were confident that the proper 
protections had been put in place against external threats. Appropriate funding and talent readiness 
were cited as the key reasons for the lack of confidence. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 6 below, 
48 percent of the respondents noted that funding was not adequate for the necessary cyber 
initiatives and 27 percent detailed that there was a lack of senior level support [62]. 
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Figure 6: Senior support and funding for cyber initiatives [62]. 
 
Every industry is different as it relates to the amount of money invested in cybersecurity; some 
industries like high-tech and banking are on the high end and others like industrial manufacturing 
and retail/wholesale on the low end. While the level of financial investment does not provide a 
direct correlation to the level of cybersecurity readiness, it does provide a leading indicator of the 
level of commitment and senior executive acceptance of the realities of a digitally enabled 
workforce. Annually, Gartner releases their IT Key Metrics Data that tracks numerous various data 
points relating to technology trends and investment. As shown in Figure 7 below, industrial 
manufacturing is at the bottom with only 4.3 percent of IT spend dedicated to IT security, with all 
industries averaging out at 6.2 percent [22]. At the time of this research, there was no data available 
to measure OT security spend; this is currently viewed as a small subset of IT security bucket. 
 
 
Figure 7: IT security spending as a percent of IT spending by industry [22] 
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Another thought-provoking metric relates to the amount of spend per employee. According to a 
2017 Gartner survey, as shown in Figure 8, the average spend on IT security per employee was 
$1,171 across all industries; for the industrial manufacturing industry, the average spend was $190 
[22]. 
 
 
Figure 8: IT security spending per employee by industry [22] 
 
As you can see through these metrics, the industrial manufacturing industry is on the low end of 
investment pertaining to IT security. This default position places additional hurdles in the way of 
providing a prudent defense-in-depth security posture. 
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Chapter 3: Review of Cyber Risks and Challenges Posed to Manufacturing Organizations 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Prior to the 21st century, the consensus was that malicious activity and cybersecurity would not 
affect manufacturing operations. This false perception was built upon the belief that OT systems 
were generally unimportant to those with nefarious intent. It was also based on denying that 
modern advancements had made OT environments vulnerable to IT threats. In this chapter, the 
risks and challenges affecting OT environments and organizations are assessed and evaluated. 
 
3.2 A Sampling of Previous Cybersecurity Exploitations in Manufacturing Operations 
Due to the long lifecycle of SCADA environments, most ICSs have little or no fundamental 
security protections built in. Until recently, security controls and related protections were not a 
consideration when manufacturing plants were designed and built. The related ICS systems lacked 
protections, such as authentication and authorization requirements. The systems did not require 
validation of code or commands downloaded to controllers that monitor and direct physical, and 
now cyber-physical, system operation. These systems used unencrypted protocols and often 
operated over networks that were not segmented. Attacks on OT and digital technology outside 
the IT space are real, prevalent and here to stay. Below is a small sampling of high-profile 
examples, which provide a real-life cross-section of IT issues in an OT setting. 
• Turkish Oil Pipeline (2008) – A Turkish oil pipeline ignited without producing any 
warnings, sensor alerts or alarms. Those investigating the event found that malicious 
entities had hacked a security camera system’s software to laterally move across the 
network and gain access to the pipeline’s ICS network. Once access was gained, pressure 
within the pipeline was increased to a point where explosions were set off causing millions 
of dollars in damage. The attack was believed to be caused by the Russian government who 
opposed the Turkish pipeline [1]. 
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• Stuxnet (2010) – Stuxnet was a targeted, specialized piece of malware introduced to 
Siemens PLC devices via a USB flash drive, thereby bifurcating any devices that were air 
gapped for security purposes. Stuxnet was the first malware to specifically target an 
industrial process [3], most notably impacting Iranian nuclear control systems. 
Manufacturing operations in Indonesia, India, Azerbaijan, the United States and Pakistan 
as well as a host of other countries were infected [45]. While no official credit has been 
taken for Stuxnet, it is believed to have been developed by the federal intelligence agencies 
of the United States and Israel within a classified program called “Operation Olympic 
Games,” specifically targeted to affect Iran’s uranium enrichment processes. Liam 
O'Murchu, the Director of the Security Technology and Response group at Symantec noted 
that Stuxnet was "by far the most complex piece of code that we've looked at — in a 
completely different league from anything we’d ever seen before" [11]. 
• German Steel Mill Cyber Attack (2014) – The German Federal Office for Information 
Security provided a report noting that a nefarious entity had penetrated a domestic steel 
facility. The malicious entity used a spear phishing email to infiltrate the enterprise 
network, laterally move into the ICS plant network and implement an advanced persistent 
threat (APT). The infiltrator caused various system components to fail, including critical 
processes, which resulted in significant physical damage to the plant [23]. No specific 
perpetrator(s) or motive have been identified to date. 
• Power Blackouts in Ukraine (2016) – Portions of the Ukraine were without power due to a 
cyber-attack on one of the country’s power systems via power supplier, Ukrenergo. 
Malicious entities gained access to the power company’s IT network at least six months 
prior to the attack. The hackers worked to gain privileged access to the SCADA 
environment(s), scouring the landscape for ways to execute the attack. The infiltrators 
could have attacked a larger surface area of the environment, but were not entirely 
successful. It is worth noting that this is not the first hack of the Ukraine power grid. In 
2015, a similar attack was conducted; both attacks were believed to be a direct result of 
Russian-led efforts [33]. 
• Honda and WannaCry (2017) – Honda halted production of multiple vehicles in a Japanese 
plant due to the WannaCry trojan. WannaCry is a trojan-based worm that spreads by 
manipulating weaknesses in the Windows operating system. Once installed, the 
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Ransomware payload encrypts files and demands a payment for decryption. Furthermore, 
WannaCry is self-propagating so once it is within a network it will attempt to use the file 
sharing protocol, server message block (SMB), to infect vulnerable hosts [36]. Operations 
at the Japanese plant were significantly impacted. Global operations in North America, 
Europe and China were not impacted, however, all reported to be infected [53]. 
 
3.3 Evaluation of Security Issues, Challenges and Risks Related to Operational Technology 
In this section, several topics will be evaluated that affect the manufacturing industry. Each area 
of interest’s problem or perception is discussed, as well as the correlating reality, to understand 
the impact of the problem or perception continuing onward. 
 
3.3.1 OT Denial of Relevance Regarding Security Threats 
Perception / Problem – There is a common denial that malicious parties have little or no interest 
in OT. This misconception is in part based on a sense of under appreciation for the value and 
importance of the OT processes, as well as the data/information generated by OT.  
 
Reality – To a malicious entity, it makes no difference whether the system(s) being compromised 
are IT or OT based. It only really matters if it is a targeted attack, at which point the level of 
expected sophistication and potential impact are raised considerably. The parties with an interest 
in attacking OT cover a wide range of players with an even wider range of motives, from 
recreational hackers and political activists to resentful employees and organized criminal 
organizations. 
 
There have been a number of presentations delivered by reputable parties bringing light to and 
explaining the threat vectors by which operational technology is vulnerable and relatively easily 
exploitable. CERT, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, regularly discloses 
vulnerabilities directed at OT. Due to the continued rise in ICS-based attacks, in 2012 the Industrial 
Control Systems Cyber Emergency Readiness Team (ICS-CERT) was established to reduce risks 
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across critical infrastructure sectors by collaborating with law enforcement agencies at every level 
(intelligence, control systems owners, operators and vendors). As of 2017, the ICS-CERT operates 
under the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) to collaborate 
with public and private sector CERTs in order to share control systems-related security incidents 
and mitigation measures [17]. In a 2016 Booz Allen Hamilton Industrial Cybersecurity Threat 
Briefing, and as shown in Figure 9 below, a 20 percent increase in ICS critical manufacturing 
related incidents was reported compared to the year prior, with expectations for the trend to 
continue to rise [52]. 
 
Figure 9: Critical cyber related incidents affecting ICS devices [52] 
 
3.3.2 OT Protocols and Systems Are Secure By Obscurity 
Perception / Problem – A perception that has been perpetuated is that OT networks, systems and 
protocols have been developed over the years from largely proprietary, standalone (e.g. Fieldbus, 
Modbus) technology, which has in some cases been insulated from the back-office enterprise 
networks. Furthermore, the notion that ICS-based solutions do not overlap with IT based 
architecture and solution design created a false pretense, which too many IT staff operate under 
[31]. These principles of an OT environment lead to a false sense of security, where IT 
professionals and the like believe that these systems and ICS solutions are obscure from attackers, 
and thus protected from malicious actions. 
 
Reality - While there are examples of extreme isolation (e.g. air gap, no cross connectivity between 
IT and OT), it is not an accurate representation of most OT networks. This separation approach 
has led to the independent development of IT and OT networks, with interconnections between 
the environments, in some cases, connections managed by third party shadow-IT based vendors or 
plant managers. As noted in a study by Verizon Labs, “there is a varying amount of interconnection 
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between OT and IT network environments with interdependencies between the two influencing 
the level of interconnection. While some organizations continue to maintain strict separation, most 
have begun to allow interconnectivity to occur in a much broader fashion” [31]. Plant managers 
and engineers are embracing this interconnectivity at a rapid rate as these advancements come with 
increased visibility to operations and accessibility to ICS systems across an enterprise. The 
challenges are that security weaknesses are more widely known, and exploitation of the systems 
is often easier, even on a larger scale [13]. These advancements make security a major concern, 
because many systems and devices in the OT domain were never designed, developed or 
envisioned to operate on an open standards–based infrastructure with a large degree of built-in 
security capabilities. Lastly, as the IT and OT models merge, historically OT protocols can be 
reverse engineered relatively easily [47]. The proprietary protocols are legacy and due to age, are 
widely understood and distributed as publicly available content. As OT protocols are compromised 
this would allow an attacker to dissect the control messages within the ICS architecture, as well as 
gain visibility to data being generated by the system. 
 
Gone are the days of proprietary protocols and networks transmitting ICS data for a manufacturing 
operation. Standards based transmission protocols, such as Ethernet, TCP/IP, 802.11 wireless and 
Bluetooth are now the norm due to the seamless interoperability between IT and OT. As it relates 
to the applications that operate the manufacturing operations, COTS components, such as 
Microsoft Windows and Linux (various flavors) are pervasive and can be easily embedded within 
most components (PLC, etc.) of an ICS architecture. These mainstream adoptions, and in some 
cases adaptations, of traditional IT platforms within the OT space provide numerous benefits. 
However, the same also extend a new range of problems into a space where human safety and 
operational reliability are put at increasing risk.  
3.3.3 Vulnerability Management and Patching Are Useless for OT 
Perception / Problem - Within ICS networks many issues combine to make traditional 
vulnerability and patch management approaches very difficult and seemingly useless. The issues 
include, but are not limited to: 
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• ICS networks cannot be scanned for vulnerabilities, as active scanning may negatively 
affect sensitive instrumentation or components. 
• ICS networks cannot be patched at all or as frequently as traditional enterprise networks.  
• SCADA systems and related components are shipped by vendors with outdated or end-of-
life operating systems. 
• ICS environments are significantly outdated because of the extended asset life-cycles on 
which these plants operate — often 20 or more years between major overhauls.  
• In many cases, ICS systems are purpose built and coded to perform specific functions, 
often for a specific client. It is not uncommon for customers to run on COTS platforms or 
custom software, which run on long unsupported operating systems or have software 
operating in critical processes from OEMs that are no longer in business. 
 
Reality - Within any OT environment there is a real business need for both vulnerability and patch 
management capabilities. There is no doubt that there are real roadblocks and detractors, which 
make instituting these capabilities a difficult task to accomplish, both technically and 
organizationally. However, cyber threats to ICS environments are real and becoming more 
prevalent. Researchers from the Georgia Institute of Technology have created a ransomware strain 
named LogicLocker that can alter PLC parameters [5]. While LogicLocker is only a proof-of-
concept, it shows the level of intelligence possible, such that the ransomware can dynamically 
identify when it is running on computers with PLC software, it can lock the device and it can alter 
the PLC parameters under the hood. Researchers agree that it is only a matter of time until PLC-
based ransomware becomes an unfortunate trend amongst malicious threat actors. 
 
Since the late 1990s, ICS manufacturers are beginning to include security in new systems, with 
engineering firms prioritizing cybersecurity in the design of new plants [2]. More prominent OEMs 
of ICS solutions, such as Siemens and Rockwell Automation, maintain databases of security 
advisories affecting the products [46] with a common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS). The 
method is used industry wide to capture the characteristics of a vulnerability and produce a 
 30 
 
numerical score reflecting its severity, to give customers a risk-adjusted approach to ensuring the 
most critical and impactful vulnerabilities can be evaluated and mitigated.  
 
3.3.4 Social Engineering is Not An OT Issue 
Perception / Problem - Social engineering is a phrase used to denote a wide spectrum of nefarious 
activities conducted by manipulating humans via various social interactions. Social engineering 
uses psychological manipulation to trick people into making decisions that compromise personal 
and usually sensitive information. There exists a perception that because the OT components of an 
environment do not directly interface with social media or communication tools, the components 
are immune from the attack by social engineering. 
 
Reality - Most social engineering attacks occur via a multiple step process. A malicious entity first 
investigates the targeted prey (individual or organization) to assemble reference information, such 
as potentially weak security protocols in order to proceed with the attack. Next, the attacker works 
to gain the target’s trust and provides a provocation for downstream activities that go against 
organizational security policies, such as unknowingly sharing sensitive information or allowing 
access to key resources. These downstream actions do not need to have direct access to the OT 
networks, as various social engineering attack techniques will sit dormant on the initiating network 
and perform reconnaissance actions in order to spread and ultimately reach the intended goal. 
Given that many OT networks are not segmented and firewalled from the corporate network, the 
spreading and infiltration can occur via a multitude of methods, such as spreading via SMB, 
removable media (refer to StuxNet) and port/application scanning. Some threats are multi-
threaded, where once a condition is met (e.g. a specific PLC device is found on the network), 
different, new actions are taken to specifically target those device types. 
 
3.3.5 Misplaced Trust In Firewalls 
Perception / Problem - Within any defense-in-depth oriented security architecture, well placed 
and properly configured firewalls provide an adequate level of protection. Some organizations, 
especially those with a lack of maturity when it comes to network security, look at firewalls as the 
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all-purpose device to protect the environment, regardless of design, configuration accuracy, 
strength of rule base, etc. 
 
Reality - While firewalls are a pivotal component protecting against unauthorized access and 
malicious activity, there are a number of factors that can prevent the necessary protections from 
being effective, including: 
• Misconfiguration – Modern firewalls are complex devices and require subject matter 
expertise to provide a hardened device configuration, as well as a well-defined ruleset to 
process the traffic passing through it. Studies have shown that improperly configured 
rulesets can create conflicts in the intended results and thus decrease the effectiveness of 
the firewall [6, 56]. 
• Insider Threats – If an attacker has already gained access to an environment or if someone 
with legitimate access knowingly (actively participating in malicious behavior) or 
unknowingly introduces an attack (e.g. via a compromised USB stick), firewalls are 
generally useless unless placed between multiple layers of the organization to section off 
or quarantine a subset of the environment. 
• Filtering Encrypted Traffic – Traditional host-based or network-based firewalls are unable 
to investigate and assess traffic across an encrypted connection. This lack of visibility can 
create a significant blind spot for both authorized and unauthorized traffic. 
• Shadow IT Introduced Connectivity – Due to a historical lack of collaboration between IT 
and OT departments, manufacturing engineering teams and/or factory operations staff 
commonly will work with suppliers, customers and other third parties to provision direct 
access to the factory network through various methods (point-to-point circuits, site-to-site 
VPN connections, etc.). The untrusted parties are placed directly on the factory operations 
network without a clear understanding of the network security consequences. 
• Lack of Peer Reviews – Generally, firewall rulesets of an organization are highly protected, 
due to inherent sensitivity. As such, the number of personnel who have access to those 
configurations/rulesets are typically restricted to those who need to know in order to 
support the organization. Because of the closely guarded nature of firewalls, organizations 
rarely perform internal peer reviews or externally conducted audits, which could help 
identify potential issues and prevent downstream negative impacts. 
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3.3.6 One-way Communication Appliances Offer 100% Protection 
Perception / Problem - In the last decade, unidirectional firewall gateways have been heavily 
marketed in high security use cases with a large push in the manufacturing sector, due to the human 
safety concerns that are inherent in SCADA environments. This is a non-routable hardware-
enforced, one-way communication product that provides efficient, unidirectional information 
transfer [48]. This technology was designed to intercept and block attempts to transmit data in the 
opposite direction, thereby protecting the information being transmitted. The manufacturing use 
case serves well where ICS systems in a defined network segment transmit data to systems outside 
the ICS space; for example, in corporate IT networks. 
 
Reality - With proper configuration and continuous oversight, this technology does elevate the 
protection scheme of any IT/OT landscape. With that said, there are caveats and limitations on 
solely relying on this technology for SCADA environment security. 
• Some unidirectional gateway technologies act as interpreters, analyzing the permutations 
of metadata as traffic attempts to traverse the network. As this interpretation occurs, there 
is the potential to inject malicious code via TCP, a two-way protocol by design. 
• A study conducted from 2013 to 2014 by the ARC Advisory group found that many 
organizations could not accept (in practice or by policy) the perceived limitations of one-
way communications, despite the recognized security benefits [55]. In these cases, one 
approach was to implement a unidirectional solution for each direction. While this 
technically provides the necessary protections, it is not practical from a fiduciary, technical 
complexity and operational overhead perspective. There are other methods to allow for 
pre-approved bi-directional traffic, but the solution begins to degrade and appears similar 
to a traditional firewall with the added complexity of specialized devices. 
• Within the TCP/IP stack, the “three-way” handshake built into TCP/IP will prevent any 
TCP/IP-based protocol from passing through a unidirectional gateway; most user datagram 
protocol (UDP) protocols require two-way communication for proper operation. In order 
to get around this issue, modern unidirectional security gateways implement custom 
software to proxy the traffic. While the technical constraints can be overcome, most 
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products on the market today have not been validated and certified for use by SCADA 
vendors, which limits application [43]. 
 
3.3.7 Endpoint Protection Is Sufficient 
Perception / Problem - There exists a perception that purpose-built ICS devices with proprietary 
operating systems are inherently protected from worms or viruses, since a significant portion of 
vulnerabilities are targeted at the Windows operating systems maintained by the IT team with the 
proper endpoint protections applied.  
 
Reality - It is true that IT and OT environments are very different, but the reality is that the 
endpoints in an OT environment are increasingly connected to the rest of the enterprise and must 
be treated and maintained just as IT environments are more than ever before. As these worlds 
converge, there is also greater risk to the OT environment. In order to mitigate potential attacks on 
OT, endpoints in the OT environment need to be protected and organizations need to ensure that 
IT endpoints are protected to avoid attacks that laterally traverse to the OT environment. An 
overarching endpoint security strategy needs to be in place for OT and IT environments to address 
endpoint management, including but not limited to: 
• Due to the traditional separation between IT and OT, the members of the IT support 
organization who traditionally have the skills and knowledge in properly protecting the 
endpoint technology may not be the same people who administer and support the OT 
environment. This can result in improperly configured technology, thus providing a false 
sense of security and a potential attack vector. 
• Worms and viruses, which traditionally deliver exploits to Windows-based devices, 
constitute only a portion of the overall threat landscape [29]. There are other attack vectors 
that are technology agnostic; these include but are not limited to account hijacking, 
information leakage and malware.  
• Endpoint protection cannot prevent all types of attacks. For example, a targeted attack will 
specialize in how to gain entry and compromise a target, whereas some attackers will 
attempt to use obscure malware to proceed undetected. This is true for specialized attacks 
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against OT, as specialized hardware and software can be difficult to identity by traditional 
IT endpoint protection defenses. 
• Without proper oversight, planning and diligence, endpoint devices can be left in a state 
that is easy to disable by attackers. This stems from potential scenarios, such as 
unconfigured devices/software (e.g. default factory credentials, settings, etc.), improper 
configuration and unnecessary services not disabled. It would not be uncommon for an 
attacker to gain access through one of these methods or worse yet via another method and 
then laterally move across the endpoints through a consistent opening in the device’s 
security configuration. 
 
3.3.8 PLCs and RTUs Do Not Need To Be Hardened 
Perception / Problem – PLCs and RTUs do not need to be hardened as they are specialized 
devices incapable of being compromised. 
 
Reality – Modern SCADA technology and related solutions are sophisticated and complex. These 
modern platforms operate in a distributed, multi-component architecture and for these reasons, the 
threat to SCADA systems is rising dramatically. PLCs and RTUs have built-in network interfaces 
and are controlled via the LAN. Additionally, due to the need for acknowledgement of executed 
actions (due to safety requirements), PLCs and RTUs communicate via TCP/IP. Some of these 
devices were designed to be holistic self-serving units to the extent that many will run services 
(e.g. telnet, file transfer protocol (FTP), dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP), web 
services, etc.) in order to self-operate the ecosystem. This allows the device to fully participate in 
manufacturing operations, as well as provide capabilities for remote management. PLCs and RTUs 
are also commonly configured and maintained by third party suppliers who specialize in the 
devices. In order to perform common administration and maintenance tasks, the devices need to 
be accessible via client VPN connectivity, so the third-party supplier can provide effective and 
efficient support remotely.  
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Chapter 4: Recommendations to Improve Cyber-Security Posture for Manufacturing 
Organizations 
 
4.1 Recommendations 
The major components of a manufacturing environment have been reviewed, as well as the 
challenges and cyber risks posed to manufacturing organizations. In this chapter, recommendations 
will be presented to improve the cybersecurity posture for these same environments. All too often, 
organizations aim too high and set goals for security compliance that are unachievable without the 
addition of numerous external resources and/or significant increases in OT budgets. The 
recommendations presented within this chapter aim to be practical, prudent, and foundational to 
any manufacturing organization where reasonable investments can be made, aligned with the 
financial and operational expectations of the organization.  
 
 4.1.1 Education About and Inclusion of OT in IT Practices 
As with any denial of risk, the first step is proper education on the problem. At multiple levels of 
the organization - IT professionals, engineers, executives and many roles in between, need to be 
aware of the reality that OT is just as important and as much of a cyber-target as IT is. All the 
traditional problems that plague IT from a cybersecurity perspective also apply to OT and should 
not be taken lightly. Beyond education, an organization’s computer incident response plan should 
be extended to address the OT. In order to make the plan truly effective across all facets of the 
organization, it should be viewed as a digital systems incident response plan with coverage across 
all digital platforms on the premises, in the cloud and everywhere in between. The incident 
response plan should include all tasks related to a security incident, including but not limited to 
detection, analysis, reporting, communication, ownership, escalation procedures, containment 
options, formal investigation practices, root cause resolution/mitigation, and close out. 
Accountability for all aspects of the plan must span not only traditional IT personnel 
(administrators, developers, CIO), but also plant operation engineers, plant managers, etc.  
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Once the hurdle of acknowledging the cybersecurity risk to OT has been surpassed, an organization 
can then move to become further aware of OT/IT related risks in a time sensitive, ongoing manner. 
Specific to the manufacturing industry, IT personnel need to adopt and understand the OT cultural 
and technology differences and be able to truly understand the different outcomes when compared 
to traditional IT; there are different imperatives in manufacturing that must be at the forefront 
(described in Table 1 and Table 2 above). Differences can be understood by conducting a number 
of different activities from walking the manufacturing shop floor in conjunction with seasoned 
plant personnel to evaluating ICS-CERT bulletins and common vulnerability and exposure (CVE) 
announcements through a lens of OT risks and related impacts. Performing these activities result 
in a more comprehensive understanding of the manufacturing processes, problems and constraints. 
In order to be successful, organizations must become informed about threats to manufacturing 
operations but also the inherent characteristics specific to the manufacturing vertical. 
 
4.1.2 Asset Inventory 
Within any IT/OT environment, a core cybersecurity principle is that which is not visible cannot 
be protected. Visibility is a fundamental cybersecurity necessity to protect assets and information. 
In order to ensure that clear visibility of the OT network is in place, a set of tools, processes and 
controls must be established. This includes enumerating all devices that have been authorized to 
participate on the network, as well as dynamically identifying unauthorized devices that have 
connected to the network. This asset inventory should provide the necessary information to address 
all aspects of the asset’s lifecycle, from initial implementation to administration, 
patching/upgrades, vendor support, configuration and connectivity (internet access or internet 
accessible). Doing so will allow an organization to take advantage of the business benefits that 
connected devices provide, while minimizing security risks.  
 
Organizations should also invest in deep packet inspection technologies, which provide advanced 
methods of examining network packets in order to identify, classify, evaluate and 
reroute/drop packets with malicious or potentially malicious payloads. In conjunction with deep 
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packet inspection, another practice that organizations should take on is whitelisting of OT traffic. 
Organizations should create a traffic map denoting all paths and traffic types under normal 
conditions. This map can be referenced in order to determine anomalies within the network, and 
when responding to a cyber-threat, remove a device from the network, as needed. Furthermore, 
this map can be used to help build virtual local area network (VLAN) and firewall access control 
lists (ACLs) for additional protections in layer 2 and layer 3. 
 
Another control that should be evaluated relates to the use of client certificates on company-
managed devices, where possible. By having a process in place to install unique device-based 
certificates within a device’s operating system, this can act as another mechanism to identify and 
authorize the device. Additionally, this could also authorize access to data/applications, the ability 
to connect to company wireless services, and the ability to connect to the network via an external 
client VPN, amongst many other opportunities. Within the manufacturing industry, and in any OT 
environment, many devices on the shop floor will not allow for the installation of certificates. In 
these cases, organizations should revert to DHCP IP and media access control (MAC) switch port 
reservations for static management and access to resources. While MACs can be spoofed, it at 
least provides another layer of defense against those trying to gain access. 
 
Due to the specialized nature of ICS equipment, identifying and fingerprinting these devices 
cannot be performed with traditional IT tools. There are two key considerations specific to 
manufacturing which must be taken into account. First, some asset inventory solutions have the 
potential to disrupt normal functions of critical ICS devices as the inventory processes are 
executed; this cannot occur under any circumstances due to the critical nature of the ICS processes. 
Secondarily, ICS device fingerprints vary widely and a vendor which has the capabilities to 
accurately map and represent the potentially vast array of assessed inventory, is a key capability. 
There are a number of solutions that can assist organizations to glean detailed information about 
their OT architecture stack across the factory floor. Solutions that succeed in this space for 
manufacturing companies provide real-time visibility to the industrial networks, by passively 
monitoring network traffic across OT network segments and modeling the usage patterns for every 
user, device and controller in the environment. They are able to fingerprint and define asset 
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information for OT devices specifically which can be used as a source for asset management 
decisions and practices going forward. Notable players in this space include Darktrace Industrial, 
SCADAfence, Zingbox and Security Matters.  
 
While physical or hardware asset management is important, so are the tools and processes for 
software asset management (SAM). By investing in tools and processes to establish SAM 
capabilities, organizations can gain a wealth of information, including but not limited to: 
• Understanding the authorized software present in the environment. This makes identifying 
unauthorized or potentially malicious software possible. 
• Implement software whitelisting as a mechanism to harden a device and prevent 
unauthorized software from being installed and executed. Having a software inventory of 
the environment will further that capability and provide the necessary insights. This is also 
a mechanism used to identify application libraries and scripts to ensure that the IT/OT 
staff place additional protections (e.g. signed certificates) on these, which would be 
harmful tools if accessed and leveraged by malicious entities. 
• Providing a level of understanding as to the versions and editions of software leveraged 
across the environment in order to understand what packages may be unsupported by the 
publisher. This will facilitate discussions, especially surrounding critical OT related 
packages, in order to ensure third party support can be provided.  
• Segregation of systems and related software, which are particularly high risk, such as 
packages that control devices having an impact on human safety or housing the company’s 
most critical intellectual property or secrets. 
 
Lastly, assets that are less tangible must also be considered; for instance, credentials for highly 
protected accounts, such as service accounts, default built-in accounts, root accounts, etc. 
Maintaining these credentials in an encrypted format, preferably in a privileged access 
management (PAM) tool will allow for delegation of authority, only accessible by those who are 
authorized to use these sensitive assets. 
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These recommendations will allow an organization to evaluate the level of risk associated with 
each endpoint and take steps to minimize that risk. In modern operations, there challenges that 
create roadblocks for achieving the necessary level of visibility. For completeness, it is important 
to understand the potential roadblocks, which include but are not limited to: 
• Lack of IT Ownership – Many devices connecting to an ICS network lack ownership and 
are commonly not considered official corporate assets. Because traditional IT teams do not 
own these devices nor have visibility to them in many cases, assessing, monitoring or 
administering the same cannot be done easily which results in no accountability for the 
assets’ life-cycle. 
• Device Mobility – Factory floors are continually driving improvements in order to increase 
the efficiency of the manufacturing processes. This is commonly performed under a lean 
or Six Sigma umbrella. ICS devices are often moved as part of the manufacturing flow 
optimization. 
• Shadow IT – Depending on the organization and segregation between IT and OT, it is not 
uncommon for engineers, or more generally, non-IT staff, to implement, configure, deploy, 
and maintain systems outside the purview of IT. Without planning, coordination and 
collaboration, devices will be provisioned, deprovisioned, and have their configurations 
changed outside the view of IT, thus making asset management and administration very 
difficult. This topic will be further addressed in a later section. 
• Isolated Solutions – Where air gapped environments or network segments that are 
unreachable by IT’s tools exist, this creates a native blind spot, which can be mitigated if 
acknowledged and disclosed to IT/OT admins up-front. 
 
4.1.3 Documentation 
Once a complete and reliable OT asset inventory has been established, it is important that a system 
architecture diagram be created, which captures all inputs and outputs under a normal controlled 
solution architecture. Many of the same tools identified in section 4.1.2 (Asset Inventory), can 
assist in mapping the OT environment landscape as part of their passive listening approach to 
understand traffic flows between devices. This system architecture diagram will allow the 
organization, IT staff and manufacturing engineers to understand and agree upon what the normal 
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characteristics of sanctioned traffic flows should look like. By having these artifacts properly 
documented and understood, a cybersecurity organization can properly whitelist those traffic 
characteristics in firewalls, intrusion detection system (IDS) and intrusion prevention system (IPS) 
devices, thus making detection of malicious activity that much easier, in advance of a potential 
breach. 
 
4.1.4 Data Classification 
Applications and the networks should be classified in order to define the level of control required. 
Data classification is based on the data’s level of sensitivity and the impact to the organization if 
it is disclosed, altered or destroyed without authorization. The classification of data helps to 
determine what level of controls are prudent and necessary for protecting that data. As defined in 
the NIST guide for mapping types of information and information systems to security categories 
[49], all institutional data should be classified by assessing a data type’s security objective 
(confidentiality, integrity and availability) against the potential impact (low, moderate, high) of 
unauthorized disclosure [49]. Doing so will provide a view into the level of security protections 
that should be implemented in order to prevent such an occurrence. For example, multi-tiered 
application servers with different security levels should be segregated by network security zones 
and VLANs according to the data present in the application.  
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Figure 10: Categorization of federal information and information systems [49]. 
 
Furthermore, once classified, organizations should take the time to assemble an inventory of all 
previously classified data and related systems that  pose an above average risk if disclosed or 
compromised. Once understood, and as part of the established governance processes, organizations 
should discuss and consider what additional protections should be placed on these systems/data to 
ensure that the applied protections are acceptable considering the risk tolerance assessed by the 
organization.  
 
Within a manufacturing organization, data classification requirements can vary and are a bit 
different from other back office functions due to the specialized nature of the information and 
personnel needed to maintain this content in an evergreen manner. As such, specific niche products 
are needed in order to address the specific needs of the organization. As an example of the 
differences, the specific requirements and potential solutions in a manufacturing organization, 
we’ll address a unique need core to the manufacturing process, engineering data. As part of any 
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produced good there are engineering drawings, bills of materials, routings which detail how the 
product is created as well as additional reference material necessary to both create and maintain 
the lifecycle of a product. Specific to the manufacturing industry, these requirements are 
commonly met with Product Data Lifecycle (PLM) / Product Data Management (PDM) tools. 
These tools manage the entire lifecycle of a product from original idea generation, engineering 
design and manufacture, to servicing and aftermarket needs. 
 
Engineering data is just one example of specific industry data which needs to be considered within 
a data classification effort. Just like engineering data, there are other tools which are specific for 
other manufacturing functions (e.g. quality management) and as such the data classification 
strategy and approach needs to take into account these specific requirements and either determine 
if the data can be classified natively within those tools or if there is a different approach required 
in order to accomplish the task at hand in order to properly classify the data. 
 
4.1.5 Patching and Vulnerability Management 
Given the breadth and depth of potential threat vectors that any enterprise ICS environment may 
contain, it is important that organizations looking to mitigate the most impactful threats take a risk-
adjusted approach to patching and validating base configurations for the most critical devices 
within the ICS network. These devices by-in-large utilize a set of unique and disparate 
technologies to execute as designed. Unlike the IT world, there is no common Operating System 
(e.g. Windows) or common patch management tools (e.g. Microsoft System Center Configuration 
Manager) for the OT side of the house. This makes patch management for OT a unique, ad-hoc 
process across the factory landscape for each individual device or group of devices. Plant engineers 
commonly work with vendors of key equipment to ensure that they are maintained adequately at 
proper software and firmware levels. Due to this fragmented landscape and lack of tools to 
cohesively patch/update these dissimilar devices and in some cases proprietary operating systems, 
we must turn our focus to vulnerability management so that we can at minimum identify vulnerable 
devices needing attention. 
 
 43 
 
From a vulnerability management perspective, it is important that organizations leverage a secure 
content automation protocol (SCAP) compliant toolset in order to leverage a referencable common 
framework for assessing vulnerability compliance [44]. Standardized expression and reporting 
allow for vulnerability assessments to be automated, which is hugely beneficial when attempting 
to identify new variances and measuring against a baseline for continuous improvement purposes 
month-over-month. It is important to note that traditional vulnerability scanning tools used for IT 
environments are not suitable for ICS environments. If a traditional active vulnerability scanner is 
used within the OT realm, issues such as increased latency, communication channel disruption and 
in some cases causing a device to cease operation can arise. Luckily, over the last 12-18 months a 
few of security firms have come to market with specialized passive vulnerability solutions 
specifically to be used for ICS environments. Most notably are firms like Tenable and CyberX that 
have entered this space with solutions designed to passively monitor traffic and leverage their 
respective proprietary analysis and threat intelligence databases to determine if an ICS device is 
vulnerable based on how it is communicating on the network. Once identified, these solutions can 
alert personnel for further investigation and provide detailed reporting as to what has been 
observed. 
 
In conjunction with vulnerability scans, organizations should conduct regular port scans against 
environments, looking for unauthorized ports/services (e.g. Telnet, FTP, etc.) present on the 
network. These unauthorized instances should be investigated to understand if there is a true 
business need or if it is a result of an oversight or misconfiguration. In environments that are well 
documented, port scans can be very powerful tools to understand variances at a deeper level, which 
may go unnoticed otherwise. This is a practice that requires a mature approach to managing the 
environment as well as available personnel to execute, as it can be a tedious and time consuming 
process if not automated. 
 
Additionally, organizations should consider performing authenticated vulnerability scanning. 
Authenticated scanning, of both elevated and non-elevated accounts, is important as it allows an 
organization to simulate what vulnerabilities are exposed assuming a malicious entity has been 
able to harvest user credentials through previously executed malicious actions. Having this level 
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of visibility through an attacker’s lens can provide insights, which may determine how data and 
applications are exposed and can be further protected across the organization. 
 
Since traditional approaches to vulnerability and patch management cannot be extended as-is 
within an OT environment, it is important to leverage existing enterprise-wide tools, policies and 
procedures where possible. It is key that IT staff partner with plant engineers and managers to 
adapt existing policies so that all parties can support and enhance the operational security practices 
specific to the OT portion of the digital footprint. It is also important to check with equipment 
manufacturers that the intended updates have been tested and qualified/validated to work properly, 
especially as it relates to the technology where human safety is a concerns. Once these policy 
updates have been agreed upon, for the OT devices that can accept updates, a defined and mutually 
agreed upon downtime schedule should be created for patching, testing and any other required 
maintenance activities. 
 
ICS component manufacturers have taken a more security conscious approach, ensuring that the 
IT organization in conjunction with the plant engineers and managers work with the OEMs to 
establish formal relationships with contractual terms. This governs what the OEMs are responsible 
for relating to product support, patch management, zero-day vulnerability response, etc. 
Establishing these formal relationships and oversight mechanisms will ensure that the IT staff is 
tightly coupled with the OEMs, such that the organization receives the support it needs in order 
prevent or respond to a security incident. 
 
4.1.6 Network Segmentation 
The goal of network segmentation is to divide the network according to business requirements, 
address compliance and regulatory concerns, while enforcing security controls between zones. 
Network segmentation utilizes security policies that act as layers of security providing defense 
from internal threats and remote users with access to the internal network (via authorized client 
VPNs. 
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A segmented network architecture is based on the concept of network security zones. Zones may 
be further segmented into smaller virtual networks to minimize operational or information 
protection risks. Security zones are logical groups of virtual networks, which in turn represent 
physical network segments that group network resources with similar security levels based on level 
of importance to the organization. In a segmented network infrastructure, VLANs and other 
controls (that are presented later in this analysis) are used to segregate devices with different 
security levels. In order to filter communications between the segments, ACLs or firewalls are 
used. 
Network segmentation is fundamental for a healthy and secured network design; however, many 
firms do not segment properly or at all for various reasons (e.g. complexity, additional overhead, 
lack of understanding and perceived value). Lack of internal network segmentation, especially 
between IT and OT data and services, is a contributor to quickly spreading security threats and 
attacks in SCADA networks [4]. IT/OT organizations need to work under the assumption of a 
breach, such that the attack needs to be compartmentalized with no ability to laterally move within 
the network to further compromise or exfiltrate data. It is common sense that most malicious 
entities (outside of nation states or highly targeted attackers) will not be persistent in an attack. If 
too much time or effort is wasted, the malicious entity will go somewhere else, again, unless the 
attack is highly targeted. Prevention is always better than having to potentially detect (if skilled or 
lucky enough) a breach.  
 
Proper network segmentation is a large part of the prevention puzzle. Benefits that network 
segmentation can provide to an organization include but are not limited to: 
• Consolidation of like devices within a defined broadcast domain can reduce unnecessary traffic 
across a broader segment, thus providing better performance, visibility (monitoring, detection, 
logging, etc.), simplified administration, and better forensic capabilities. 
• Obscurity of network segments (when properly segmented with firewalls) to malicious entities 
deters their ability to laterally move in the environment. Leveraging the premise of least 
privilege and a global deny ruleset allows only explicitly understood and sanctioned traffic to 
pass from one segment (trust profile) to another. 
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• Separation of different applications/data into zones, which classify different data sensitivity 
levels so that additional protections and restrictions (via ACLs) can be placed upon the most 
sensitive zones within an organization. 
• Reduced surface area for an attacker to compromise devices within a defined segment. 
Traditional segmentation practices as well as more modern micro-segmentation (traffic 
between any two endpoints can be analyzed and filtered based on a defined policy) techniques 
allow organizations to categorize or sub-categorize sensitive or highly critical portions of the 
network. Assuming a position that the organization has been breached, if properly segmented 
and protected with advanced security controls (such as multi-factor authentication), the 
attacker will not have a diverse inventory of network devices to work with. 
 
4.1.6.1 Improvements to the Traditional Model 
While the PERA model provides a solid foundation from which to segment an enterprise 
manufacturing network, it leaves much to be desired in a modern IT/OT landscape where security 
threats are complex and pervasive. There are several controls and protections that are practical and 
fiscally responsible and provide tremendous in-depth defense improvements; examples are 
explored below. 
 
4.1.6.1.1 VLAN Access Control Lists (VACLs) 
VALCs provide access control for packets that are spanned within a VLAN or that are routed into 
or out of a VLAN for VACL evaluation. VACLs apply to all packets and can be applied to any 
VLAN, are processed in the hardware and can apply to both IP and MAC-based traffic. If a VACL 
is set up for a packet type, and there is a miss-match, the default action is to deny the packet. 
VACLs can also be used to filter traffic between devices in the same VLAN. VACLs can be used 
in conjunction with the other segmentation technologies but can be largely redundant and add 
operational overhead, if not implemented properly.  
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4.1.6.1.2 Private VLANs 
Further isolation of IT/OT resources can be achieved using private VLANs. A private VLAN is a 
secondary, or subset type of a VLAN. The benefits of private VLANs are additional network 
segmentation and isolation, if needed. Highly sensitive information can be insulated from other 
VLANs with restricted access if further isolation is warranted. 
 
There are two types of private VLANs, community and isolated. A community VLAN is a 
secondary VLAN that transmits packets from the community ports to the upstream promiscuous 
port as well as to other ports within the same community. Multiple community VLANs can be 
configured in a private VLAN domain. The ports within one community can communicate with 
each other, but these ports cannot exchange data with ports in any other community. An isolated 
VLAN is the other type of private VLAN, which carries traffic from the host directly to the 
promiscuous port alone. Only one isolated VLAN can be configured in a private VLAN domain. 
An isolated VLAN can have numerous isolated ports, however, all traffic from each isolated port 
remains separate. Promiscuous ports can forward traffic from every secondary VLAN, as well as 
the primary VLAN. Figure 11 and Figure 12, shown below, provide views of how community and 
isolated VLANs operate. 
 
Figure 11: Private VLAN example 
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Figure 12: Private VLAN community example 
 
4.1.6.1.3 Port Protection 
Port protection is similar to private VLANs, but it is simpler and less flexible. The port protection 
feature works by designating a physical port as protected, at which point it will not exchange data 
traffic with other protected ports. Protected ports will interact with non-protected ports in a normal 
fashion, exchanging data. This allows administrators to prevent two machines within the same 
subnet and VLAN from talking without going through an upstream non-protected port that usually 
will have some device connected to inspect and filter traffic. Thus, making it less likely that a 
compromised device or virus infected machine will be used to attack other hosts without triggering 
alarms or logs. Port protection can be used in a data center environment to stop attackers from 
using one compromised server as a launching point to attack other servers on the same segment. 
While this is a powerful capability, it is more often used at the end user host ports (e.g. PCs), 
because private VLANs provide more flexibility, and data center switches are more likely to 
support private VLANs than switches on the enterprise edge. 
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Figure 13: Port protection example 
 
4.1.6.1.4 802.1x Network Access Control (NAC) 
802.1x addresses the problem of manually managing the large majority of edge ports in an 
enterprise environment. In an environment where 802.1x is not leveraged, an attacker is able to 
plug into physical network outlets and gain access to the internal network. From a network 
administration perspective, it is impractical for any IT/OT support organization to manually 
configure and audit every active network port across an enterprise network on a continual basis.  
 
In order to address this administrative nightmare, 802.1x can be deployed to centrally manage, via 
preconfigured policies, the configuration and controls placed on edge ports across the enterprise. 
In order to enable this capability, edge switches and host operating systems must explicitly support 
the feature, because layer 2 frames are exchanged using a data format that differs from standard 
Ethernet. If both sides are not 802.1x capable, access will not be granted. A host and an edge switch 
negotiate 802.1x parameters, such as machine identity, which the switch will relay to the 802.1x 
controller. The controller will inform the switch which VLAN the host belongs on, and potentially 
which downloadable ACL should be applied to the port. This is commonly determined via active 
directory (AD) groups. This can be accomplished for both wired and wireless hosts.  
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Once port authentication and NAC policies have been fully configured and deployed, it becomes 
one of its more powerful features to identify unauthorized or rogue devices connecting to the 
network. These unauthorized devices could be as simple as a visitor connecting a laptop to an 
Ethernet jack in a conference room or as complex as someone deploying additional unauthorized 
network switches or wireless access points within the facility. While vulnerability management 
tools may be able to identify these hosts, it would only be reactionary and there would be no 
proactive action taken to quarantine the unauthorized device and alert the proper technicians or 
security personnel. In a worst-case scenario, whether it be via malicious intent or a vulnerable 
third-party host with an active persistent threat (APT), NAC provides the necessary capabilities to 
maintain the hygiene of the devices authorized to connect to the network. By deploying NAC, any 
issues stemming from hosts that roam across the network are addressed by the port/connection-
based policies being applied via the NAC policy engine. While deploying NAC can be costly and 
require significant up-front fees to institute, the level of protection a well-built NAC solution can 
provide is enormous, especially in a high-risk environment. 
 
With a NAC solution in place, additional manufacturing specific capabilities and benefits can be 
obtained. For example, further network security automation of ICS devices can be obtained by 
using a policy based industrial network administration tool. Tools like Cisco Industrial Network 
Director (IND) integrate with NAC products like Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) to provide 
visibility and context to plant engineers for all networked ICS devices. Policies in ISE can be 
configured by IT personnel in advance, which can be used by the plant engineers via a user 
interface specifically designed for manufacturing operations. Through this interface, plant 
personnel are able to visualize connectivity between network devices and ICS assets so that 
predefined policy based changes can be dynamically made in an OT context without having the 
plant operators to be technically savvy. For example, consider a scenario where a plant engineer 
needs to allow a third party support vendor access to critical ICS components. The plant engineer, 
in a matter of minutes, through the IND interface can allow access to the specific device or set of 
devices for the vendor to access, without having engage IT or configure complex rulesets on the 
firewall or VPN appliance. Once the plant engineer saves his changes, the IND communicates with 
ISE to update the policy and push the new configuration to the necessary network devices to 
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ultimately allow access. This capability prevents the need to maintain a persistent ACL on the 
firewall with access open at all times.  
 
4.1.6.1.5 Tiered Application Architecture 
Tiered application architecture as a control makes use of the functional containerizing of an 
application. Containerizing enables the application to be broken down into functional units, which 
can be implemented across multiple servers. Typical functional units include a web/presentation 
layer, an application layer, and a database/processing layer. Access to the functional units is much 
cleaner and more secure using this approach. To illustrate this example please refer to the diagram 
in Figure 14 below. In this diagram, access to the web server layer would be enabled through a 
firewall-based TCP port number(s) for the application. Since applications can be used from 
anywhere within the environment, a source IP address cannot be used to limit access. However, it 
is important to note that the users will not have any access to the database servers, as depicted in 
the diagram. Access to the database servers would be limited to the web server(s) only. Note that 
the application could have additional functional layers, which would also be protected by firewalls 
with tightly controlled access. 
 
Using this strategy, access to servers can be more tightly controlled, thereby reducing the potential 
threat surface. Only the presentation server needs to be accessed by users. All other functional 
layer servers (database, application or processing servers) will have access blocked from general 
users. The only access to these servers will be the other servers running components of the 
application requiring access, explicitly permitted via the applicable firewall rules. It is worth noting 
that this architecture cannot be implemented without the assistance of the application support 
teams and the application publisher or system integrator. A determination must be made as to 
whether or not the application can be implemented using functional layers. Once determined that 
it can be decoupled logically, the IT/OT teams must undertake the effort required to move 
functional layers to different servers. Additionally, allowing access to the application based on IP 
port number leaves the server exposed to attack, as it can still be accessed by anyone with access 
to the network. Access is restricted, but it remains open to anyone knowing the port and IP address. 
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The logical diagram below shows an example of a segmented two-tier application that consists of 
three front-end web servers and three back-end database servers located on separate VLANs. 
Application end-users can access front-end servers only. Direct access to the database servers is 
not allowed. Communication between front-end and back-end servers is controlled by ACLs on 
the firewalls. 
 
 
Figure 14: Tiered application flow diagram 
 
4.1.6.1.6 Air Gap 
An air-gapped network is one where there is no connection of any kind from the corporate network 
to the target network being protected. This architecture is leveraged in situations where the network 
being protected is fully self-sufficient (i.e. no dependency on other services outside of the segment) 
and the unauthorized disclosure of information would have a significant adverse effect on 
organizational operations, assets or individuals. 
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4.1.6.1.7 Wireless Networks 
Wireless networks provide a wide breadth of capability, especially for a space constricted and 
ever-changing factory floor layout where lean principals drive efficiencies, requiring equipment 
to be moved in areas where traditional cabled networks would have created restrictions [39]. When 
enabling wireless networks in an OT environment, especially with additional prevalence across 
the factory floor, there are several considerations that need to be carefully evaluated and planned 
for. Some of the more fundamental considerations are listed below. 
• Inventory of broadcasted approved service set identifies (SSIDs) so that rogue or 
unauthorized wireless networks can be easily identified. 
• SSIDs should be broken out by function and segmented in accordance with their data 
classification rating. 
• An internally managed device should require a company issued certificate and AD 
credentials to join the network.  
• Disable split tunneling across all interfaces in order to prevent multiple different networks 
from being unintentionally bridged. 
• Ensure that AES-256bit encryption is the minimum allowable on data in transit. 
• Disable any unnecessary access methods, such as Bluetooth, near-field communications 
(NFC), etc. 
• A specific guest wireless network should be implemented for third parties that are visiting 
the company and need temporary access to customary services (web browsing, email, etc.). 
Devices in this segment shall have no access to internal resources.  
• Devices that do not accept certificates (e.g. barcode scanners) should have the MAC 
address whitelisted so that all other unknown devices can have access denied implicitly. 
• If company policy allows for the use of personal devices as part of a larger bring your own 
devices (BYOD) policy, a separate SSID should be used with specific and defined host 
integrity policy (HIP) checks. HIP checks validate the cyber health of the device (AV, 
patches, etc.) and should be instituted prior to allowing the device to access company 
resources. 
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• Wireless technology on the shop floor can be troublesome due to the signal interference 
with the heavy machinery. It is recommended that frequent wireless surveys are conducted 
to ensure dead signal spots do not exist where connectivity is required. 
 
4.1.6.1.8 Separation of Production and Non-Production Traffic 
Organizations should separate but mirror production segments from other segments, such as 
quality, test, development, etc., to ensure confidential data held on a well-guarded production 
server is not moved to a potentially less protected development server. 
 
4.1.6.1.9 Separation of Enterprise and Manufacturing Traffic 
Organizations should separate the manufacturing network from the internal corporate network. 
This is per best practices in NIST Special Publication 800-82 R2, Guide to Industrial Control 
Systems Security [26]. The nature of network traffic on these two networks is different. As an 
example, the corporate network, internet access, FTP, email or remote access should never have 
direct access to the manufacturing network. If manufacturing traffic is carried on the back-office 
LAN, it could be intercepted and subjected to denial of service (DoS) or man-in-the-middle 
(MITM) attacks. By segmenting the networks, security and performance issues on the corporate 
network should not affect the manufacturing network.  
 
According to NIST 800-82 R2, practical considerations, such as cost of ICS installation or 
maintaining a consistent network infrastructure, often mean that a connection is required between 
the ICS and corporate networks [26]. This connection is a significant security risk and should be 
protected by firewalls with a well-defined rule set. If the networks must be connected, only 
necessary (bare minimum) connections should be allowed and the connection should be through a 
firewall and a DMZ. A DMZ is a separate network segment that connects directly to the firewall. 
Servers should be established in the DMZ, which are solely used as bastion hosts or jump boxes, 
to access the manufacturing network containing the data from the ICS. Only these bastion systems 
should be accessible from the corporate network, and in turn, are the only devices that can access 
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the manufacturing segment. With any external access inbound, minimum access should be 
permitted through the firewall, including port/service restrictions. 
 
4.1.6.1.10 Network Segmentation of Manufacturing Devices 
Per NIST 800-82 R2, network segmentation is one of the most effective practices that an 
organization can implement to protect its manufacturing network [26]. Segmentation establishes 
separate security domains to enforce a consistent security policy and maintain a uniform level of 
trust. Segmentation, if architected with data classification in mind, can minimize the method and 
level of access to sensitive devices. A practical consideration in defining a security domain is the 
amount of communications traffic that crosses the domain boundary, because domain protection 
typically involves examining boundary traffic and determining whether it is permitted. 
 
The use of a bastion host for all access to the manufacturing network, which includes all third-
party vendor access, is critical to the security of the ICS. This can also be accomplished using a 
jump box to an engineering or supervisor workstation. If a vendor requires direct access from a 
non-company issued machine, a very specific rule should be devised to allow access through the 
firewall policy. This should require managerial approval, be labeled clearly in the relevant ruleset, 
and be as specific as possible. Access to the internal network or internet should be over a separate 
workstation and not from one in the ICS. This is to avoid creating a backdoor into the security 
zone housing sensitive company data. 
 
Within the manufacturing network, improvements can be made to identify and associate like 
devices together into separate segments so that additional controls/protections can be placed, 
where appropriate. As an example, devices that perform data aggregation (e.g. sensors) should be 
grouped together and controlled separately from PLCs and RTUs, which should be placed into a 
separate grouping. Lastly, devices that allow and require regular human interaction to operate the 
manufacturing network, such as HMIs, should operate in a separate grouping. Continuing this 
example, there are now three distinct groupings, which can each have different, meaningful 
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controls (e.g. community or isolated private VLANS, port protection, VACLs, 802.1x, NAC, etc.) 
aimed at protecting the data and devices from malicious activities. 
 
4.1.7 Proposed Reference Architecture 
While the PERA model provided a referencable framework that was relevant for many years, 
beyond a simplistic separation of networks, it really provided no protection from a security 
compliance perspective. Building on this model, there are a number of improvements that have 
been made over the years, as well as recommendations for future operating models. Below is a 
proposal for a reference architecture, which views the OT landscape through a single digital lens 
in order to provide the necessary fundamental protections for modern information systems in an 
OT environment. 
 
Within this new proposed model, level 1 through level 4 are the same, relating to the type of 
devices that reside in each level. The differences, however, consist of the technology protections 
being implemented to further secure factory operations. While these technology protections were 
discussed earlier in the document, additional context is added below. 
• Access via Bastion Host – Any IP-enabled OT devices should be managed by physically 
walking up to the device and connecting a console/network cable or accessing the device 
via a shared bastion host, dedicated to the management and administration of devices that 
participate in the factory operations. This provides a centralized “choke point” for all 
personnel to access these highly protected devices with additional controls applied at the 
bastion host (e.g. multi-factor authentication, enhanced logging, privileged access 
management, etc.). Direct management and administration of these devices are to be 
blocked at the firewall as well to enforce one-way into the environment. 
• MAC Whitelisting – Since most of the devices at this level will not be Lightweight 
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) or AD-integrated, a device-based certificate will be 
carried (where possible), and each hardware MAC address should be added to a layer 2 
whitelist to be allowed to connect and communicate across the network. 
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• NAC – Network access control will prevent unauthorized devices from connecting to the 
network and gaining access to resources. 
• Layer 2 VLAN ACLs – While redundant with the use of port protection, layer 2 VLANs 
act as a backstop for any misconfigured ports within the VLAN. All valid traffic should be 
explicitly identified so that factory operations are not interrupted. 
 
Above level 4 a new level is proposed, level 4.5 – control network DMZ. This segment houses all 
remote access services to access devices in levels 1 through 4. The remote access services residing 
in this network can be solutions such as Microsoft remote desktop services (RDS) server (formerly 
terminal server), Citrix gateway or an SSH terminal. These jump boxes are to be connected to via 
a dedicated management network, from the enterprise network, with an elevated account that is 
different from the normal credentials used to access other non-OT resources. Users should also be 
prompted to authenticate with a second factor as part of the overall enterprise multi-factor 
authentication architecture. Once successfully connected, these hosts can access all devices in the 
factory operations from level 1 to level 4. 
 
Lastly, an external DMZ network has been added, level 6. The external DMZ segment should host 
any servers/services that need to be exposed to the internet. This segment should contain services 
such as external client-based VPN, web services, transmission services (e.g. SFTP) or any other 
IP-based services that have a legitimate business need to be exposed to the internet. Access should 
be controlled to known, valid destinations and application services (HTTP, HTTPS, SFTP, etc.), 
all passing through an application aware web application firewall (WAF). All external access for 
third party OEMs or maintenance organizations needing to access devices in the factory should 
use client VPN services to establish an encrypted connection to the organization’s perimeter. Once 
properly authenticated, again with multi-factor authentication, the only devices that can be 
accessed (via ACLs on the VPN tunnel) are those that have been approved to access level 4.5 – 
the control network DMZ. 
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Figure 15: Proposed reference architecture for manufacturing environments 
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4.1.8 Hardening of Factory Floor Devices 
As a precaution, organizations should understand how to harden devices within the factory 
environment and execute those hardening procedures for all network-based devices.  
 
This may be a difficult task for legacy SCADA-based devices, as the OT manufacturers did not 
have security in mind during design. The good news is that most SCADA devices produced by 
reputable manufacturers can be hardened to some degree. It is important that when specifying, 
designing and implementing these devices the IT and OT teams work very closely with the 
manufacturer to ensure security considerations are discussed up front as part of the pre-sales 
process. 
 
For traditional Windows- or Linux-based PCs, which participate in the factory floor processes, this 
step is even more important because many of the services and functions that are enabled by default 
are not required for manufacturing processes and should be disabled in order to reduce the threat 
landscape available to a malicious entity.  
 
Across both spectrums (SCADA devices and Windows/Linux PCs), there are several actions that 
can be taken to significantly reduce the threat surface, such as: 
• Standard image – Wherever possible, leverage a hardened standard image. This will provide a 
consistent baseline for a well-configured device, which internal and vendor configurations can 
be based upon. Standard images should be reviewed twice a year to re-establish a hardened 
state with releases of new operating system patches, firmware, etc. 
• Eliminate access to the internet – Where access cannot be eliminated fully, whitelist the 
applications/services that the factory floor devices require to a defined, pre-approved list. Keep 
the list updated and ensure that periodic reviews are done in order to update and prune the list 
as technology changes. 
• Browser Hardening – While the best path from a security perspective is to prevent all internet 
access from factory floor devices, it is understood that there may be a need to allow access to 
select whitelisted destinations. In conjunction with significantly limiting access, hardening the 
browser configuration is another avenue that should be investigated. Areas of focus include, 
but are not limited to: 
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o Preventing installation of unauthorized/additional browsers. 
o Disabling/preventing use of browser plug-ins and add-ons. 
o Leverage URL category filtering tools for reputation analysis. 
• Lock down removable drive accessibility – Restrict all access to removable drives so that read 
and/or write functions are disabled. Where access cannot be eliminated fully, whitelist the 
removable media device types, drivers, etc. that can be used and disable auto-run capability on 
all external media. Above all, as part of the cybersecurity awareness and training program, 
inform users that using removable media from an unknown source is never allowed. 
• Limit Physical Access – For the back-end infrastructure, ensure that all servers and related 
storage appliances are in secured data centers, which prevent access to unauthorized 
individuals. Client access/workstations that have access to critical devices/data on the network 
should be in physically segregated locations within the facility, such that access can only be 
gained by authorized personnel. 
• Prevent / Restrict Remote Access – All access from networks external to the factory operations 
network are blocked by default and remote access is granted for pre-approved parties via IT 
managed client VPN services. 
• Application Whitelisting – All PCs and servers that participate in factory operations processes 
should have unsigned and unregistered executables blocked (by default) from running on 
workstations and only allowed via a whitelisting process in conjunction with the software asset 
management processes. Taking this preventative measure will significantly reduce the 
possibility that malicious software could execute within the environment. 
• Enhanced Logging, Monitoring and Alerting to Centralized SIEM – All devices capable of 
generating logs should have the logs ingested by a centralized security information and event 
management (SIEM) service. An SIEM service can assemble the disparate logs and identify 
patterns of malicious activity so that actions can be taken to prevent or stop any further 
malicious activity. 
• Local Administrator Rights – All too often, PCs and servers are left vulnerable by providing 
too many rights, as well as default configurations. The following activities should be 
undertaken to further protect the devices within the factory operations environment: 
o Rename the local administrator account. 
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o Use a tool such as Microsoft LAPS [25] to randomize the local administrator password 
for each device on the network. 
o Do not allow local accounts on PCs or servers to be used. These accounts are not 
centrally managed and can be used to bifurcate other environment controls. 
o Do not allow accounts to have local administrator access to the device, unless 
absolutely necessary. 
o For the accounts being used to run the factory operations, ensure provisioning in a least 
privileged manner. Providing excess privileges, unnecessary to performing the duties 
of the role, can provide a mechanism for exploits or lateral movement to occur. 
o Remove or rename any other built-in or default accounts that may be easily guessed. 
• Governance – Establish a governance process that includes personnel from information 
technology and operations engineering, as well as any other parties that have responsibilities 
related to how the factory’s operations are designed, configured and maintained. With these 
key personnel identified, a working group or committee should be formed to address all aspects 
of OT’s lifecycle (installation, configuration, administration, patches/firmware, obsolescence, 
retirement, etc.). 
• Multi-Factor Authentication – One of the most valuable assets an attacker can compromise are 
credentials. By introducing multi-factor authentication across a factory environment, 
credentials and access to key resources (e.g. intellectual property, research and development 
information and operational processes) can be further protected. In order to be truly effective, 
multi-factor authentication should be placed at every level of the environment, including but 
not limited to access to client VPN, PC/server logins and web application logins.  
• Configuration Management Tools – Configuration management tools, such as Microsoft 
system center configuration manager (SCCM), should be considered in order to baseline 
hardened desired state configurations for devices in the environment. Most of the tools in this 
space can reapply the baseline configuration when changes are detected, as well as 
provisioning alerting to IT/OT administrators so that root causes can be investigated for future 
prevention purposes. 
• Disable Wireless – Unless required to communicate on the network, disable any unnecessary 
interfaces. This includes traditional wireless interfaces, as well as Bluetooth. 
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4.1.9 Implement Firewall Best Practices 
A number of shortcomings of traditional host- and network-based firewalls have been discussed. 
Modern firewall technologies combined with augmenting a layered approach with respect to 
firewalls can provide an elevated level of protection. The recommended changes include but are 
not limited to: 
• Implement Application Aware Firewalls – Many potent vulnerabilities exist at the application 
layer, which would be much more difficult, almost virtually impossible, to detect with a 
traditional host or network-based firewall. Application aware firewalls can inspect the traffic 
at the application layer and evaluate the traffic accordingly [32]. Per recent studies on firewall 
configuration effectiveness for SCADA environments [35], outdated firewall software was 
prominently in use, compromising the necessary protections. 
• Decrypt Encrypted Traffic At The Firewall – Since many attacks that are executed remotely 
occur over an encrypted tunnel, it is paramount that this traffic be inspected as well. Luckily, 
many modern firewalls with specialized hardware can now decrypt that traffic as it passes 
through. The traffic is also inspected by the application-aware firewall rule base and assuming 
it is approved, it is re-encrypted and passed to the next hop. This is all conducted with 
negligible latency and without the source or the destination being aware, or the communication 
stream being interrupted. 
• Deploy An Effective Defense-In-Depth Strategy – Within the anatomy of a hack and with some 
degree of variability based on the intended outcome, several things must go right for the 
malicious entity in order to comprise the target. A malicious entity must perform 
reconnaissance on the target in order to understand the landscape, execute an initial 
compromise to gain entry and establish a foothold all while operating undetected. Elevated 
privileges may be needed to gain access to the target data/systems, which means lateral 
movement and expansion of the footprint, may occur. Once the target is found, the attack is 
executed and if needed, the data is exfiltrated and if warranted a persistent presence is 
maintained for future potential malicious activities. In most cases, the time investment to 
perform all of these actions can be the deciding factor in whether a hacker is successful or 
becomes disengaged and moves on to the next target. A significant determinant of 
disengagement is how complex performing any one of the above activities in the lifecycle of a 
hack is (excluding sophisticated attacks from nation-states and terrorist organizations whose 
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determination is typically much higher). In order to increase the complexity, and thus, the time 
required to execute a hack, organizations must think and act with a defense-in-depth mindset. 
This mindset is not accomplished by procuring and implementing technology alone. This is 
accomplished by combining technical, organizational and operational controls, which co-exist 
in a governed manner with levels of understanding and acknowledgement across an 
organization.  
• Rule Effectiveness – When relying on a firewall to thwart access attempts by unauthorized 
personnel, having a properly configured rule base is paramount. In a study conducted by Wool 
via Tel Aviv University in 2004, 84 firewall rulesets were reviewed [61]. Of those rulesets, 36 
categories of configuration errors were established (Figure 16, 17). Of those 36 categories, 22 
were either inherently risky or allowed traffic to pass through the firewall from outside 
interface(s). 
 
 
Figure 16: Distribution of firewalls, as a percent, to which the configuration error was present [61] 
(Outbound traffic “o”, internal traffic “d”, inherent risky “r”, inbound traffic “I”)  
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Figure 17: Number of errors as a function of the rule set’s complexity [61] (Magenta – least square linear regression 
fit, teal – one standard deviation above, brown - one standard deviation below). 
 
Deliberate effort spent on keeping a rule base simple is in the best interest of any organization. 
Studies have proven [61, 35] that organizations should prevent the use of implied or broad rules 
should be avoided and substituted with explicit rules based on clear intent. Doing so can be a 
significant contributor to generating simple and effective firewall configurations rather than 
complex and ineffective ones. A simple approach to firewall rulesets, from a practical perspective, 
is easier said than done. In order to practically address this component of a well-rounded defense-
in-depth scheme, it is also recommended that annually organizations invest in a third-party led 
firewall configuration and rule audits. This will not only provide a sanity check as it relates to the 
effectiveness of an organization’s firewalls, but it also acts as a health check relating to new threats 
that an organization may be unaware of. This is especially true within a manufacturing 
organization, where there may not be dedicated firewall security personnel keeping up with 
changes in the technology or the threat landscape.  
 
4.1.10 Implement Meaningful Security Awareness Training 
Compromises via social engineering techniques are an ever-evolving threat landscape. The 
attackers devise sophisticated schemes to gain personal information and/or entry into an 
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environment. These attack schemes cannot be mitigated by a specific counter-action; however, 
preventing and protecting against breaches can be accomplished by applying a defense-in-depth 
approach as well as an effective security awareness training program. Specific to the 
manufacturing vertical, as part of creating a comprehensive security awareness program, 
organizations need to deliberately and consciously educate personnel on OT relevant concepts, 
industry terminology, and examples of business issues stemming from poor OT related cyber 
practices. As part of this comprehensive approach, organizations need to educate personnel on the 
threat vectors and downstream effects of using social media and how being compromised can lead 
to other lateral advances impacting OT. 
• Security Awareness Training - Relative to a security awareness program, studies by 
Gartner showed that there are four key objectives when deploying an effective security 
awareness program that drive real meaningful actions [16]. 
o Build a knowledge base - Creation of a referencable and easy to understand security 
and risk knowledge base across the workforce results in a shared understanding of what 
is important to the organization (e.g. password management, encryption of removable 
media). Make it available to end users and market its’ usefulness. 
o Ability to comply with regulatory requirements - Where required, a regulated 
enterprise must maintain a cybersecurity training program to ensure that the culture is 
aligned with the regulatory body requirements. This involves the identification of 
specific provisions for compliance, capturing specific criteria to satisfy the 
regulation(s) and applying the necessary controls/provisions to demonstrate adherence. 
o Define a behavioral baseline - In order to be able to hold an individual accountable to 
adhering to the security policies of the organization, it is important that the expectations 
of the organization be clearly defined. Additionally, proper education must be provided 
with objective evidence (signing an acknowledgement form, etc.) indicating the 
employee has been educated on the required policy and related practices.  
o Motivate secure behavior - Encouraging positive actions while disapproving of 
undesired behaviors is necessary in order to achieve the desired representative 
behaviors. Using classical conditioning techniques via reward and penalty systems, the 
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desired and undesired behaviors must be identified and described in enough detail to 
enable targeted monitoring and reinforcement. 
 
Manufacturing organizations need to begin applying the same importance and rigor to 
cybersecurity as they do with overall human safety. It can be expected that in some 
organizations, cybersecurity training is either not addressed or only executed to “check the 
box” for insurance or regulatory purposes. In addition to this, cybersecurity training needs 
to be effective for OT personnel, at an appropriate educational level, so that correlations 
between actions and the impact to the factory floor can be understood clearly. 
• Communication/Social Media Exposure To The Network – Organizations should ensure 
that there is a clear separation between the functions (email, internet access, etc.) that can 
be performed on PCs with access to the factory operations network(s) and those that should 
be conducted outside of the network entirely. For example, while there may be a 
productivity benefit to having an email client (e.g. Outlook) on a factory operations PC or 
allowing access to an organization’s web email service (Outlook Web Access, Gmail, etc.), 
this provides a direct avenue for email-based phishing attempts to exploit PCs with direct 
or indirect access to SCADA environments. Access to tools should be restricted on PCs 
within the factory operations environment and only via an exception process, once a 
thorough risk analysis has been conducted with mitigating controls established to combat 
potential malicious activities. In exceptional cases where communications and social media 
tools are allowed within the factory operations environment, clear and deliberate education 
must be provided related to suspicious senders, methods to inject malware via content 
categories and advanced spoofing techniques employed by those wishing to do harm. 
• Sensitive Data Handling – While data classification is an important part of protecting 
important company data, it is virtually worthless if the employees entrusted to work with 
the data and systems are not trained on how to classify, store, transfer and destroy it 
properly. Organizations need to ensure that end user education for sensitive data handling 
is an open discussion where examples can be shared and data owners are held accountable. 
• Identification and Reporting of Security Incidents – Part of a proactive security awareness 
program addresses the ability of the end user population to speak up when something 
appears to be awry or troublesome from an IT security perspective. Understanding the 
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common indictors of concern and knowing who to contact in a timely fashion is critical to 
thwarting active cyber threats. 
 
4.1.11 Implement Endpoint Protection Fundamentals Across The OT Landscape (Where 
Possible) 
Endpoint protection is like anything else in the security realm; it is only one piece of the security 
posture and when combined with other technologies and practices it will be effective. As 
mentioned earlier, a key tenant of information security is that which is not visible cannot be 
protected. Organizations need to have an inventory of assets (hardware, virtual and software), and 
visibility into the respective configurations, operating system (OS) levels, protocols and 
communications, as well as who has access, when and for what purposes. These components of an 
asset inventory define the key areas most often involved when a breach occurs. Building from the 
asset information, the following capabilities can be addressed relating to endpoint protection. 
• Anti-Virus (AV) - Ensure that whichever AV package has been selected it is regularly 
updated with the proper signatures. Not all signature-based AV packages are effective and 
should be combined with a software whitelisting service. Where AV cannot be applied 
within an OT environment, other mitigating controls must be put in place to lower the 
exposed risk. 
• Application Whitelisting - An application whitelisting service allows software on a device 
to be approved to execute while denying any other software. This level of protection is key 
when it comes to preventing malware from unknowingly being installed. Within an OT 
environment, application whitelisting is a strong compensating control that can be 
instituted when other endpoint security practices cannot be leveraged due to the ICS related 
constraints (e.g. latency, sensitive interfaces, etc.). 
• Endpoint Vulnerability Analysis - Every device within the OT environment that either is 
on the network or contains some type of communications port (e.g. USB) has a potential 
attack vector. Not all endpoints and risks are the same. Ensure that a risk-based approach 
is taken when evaluating investments for additional protections to ensure the broadest and 
most impactful net is cast when protecting an organization’s assets. 
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• Safe Computing Practices - IT/OT personnel must further invest in combating the 
potentially negative effects that human behavior has on technology. Humans themselves 
are extremely susceptible attack vectors and whether compromised because of social 
engineering or simple human error, poor education, training and computing practices 
significantly degrade protections. 
• Configuration Management - Assuming the asset inventory has been assembled, 
organizations should take the next step and document the existing configurations for 
dissimilar device types. Having this level of information available not only allows an 
organization to set a strong, hardened baseline, but in the case of a compromise, variations 
can be more easily identified and investigated. Identifying unauthorized changes as close 
to real time as possible will allow an organization to limit further potential malicious 
activity. 
 
Lastly, organizations must study the implications of endpoint protection in an OT context from 
both of the following perspectives: 
• What needs to be augmented in traditional IT approaches in order to ensure efficacy in the 
OT realm where the devices and software are specialized? 
• What constraints exist in the OT realm concerning how endpoints are updated, maintained 
and designed with respect to endpoint protection mechanisms, and how can human safety 
and revenue realization remain uncompromised? 
 
4.1.12 Harden PLCs and RTUs 
Given that PLCs and RTUs are well designed and intelligent devices running services that can be 
compromised (e.g. Telnet, HTTP), these devices must be treated the same as any other devices on 
the network. 
• Disable Unnecessary Services / Hardening - Most of these devices come from the 
manufacturer with many unnecessary services enabled. IT/OT administrators must take the 
time to work with the manufacturer and understand which services are essential for 
operation and then disable all other services. Where overlap exists with previously 
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managed services, such as DHCP, a singular solution should be leveraged that provides the 
most hardened configuration. Once defined, an organizational standard should be 
established to define a baseline configuration for other like devices within the organization. 
• Controls to Limit Ports, Protocols and Services - As part of the hardening process, a system 
architecture diagram and the requisite data flows should be established to understand the 
components through which the traffic traverses. This data flow mapping process will allow 
the organization to understand where the weak links are in a potential attack path so that 
hardening activities can be applied to the same [30]. Once understood, access control lists 
(ACLs) should be established to control traffic to the active and necessary ports, services 
and protocols. If application-aware firewalls are in use, ACL definitions can be created at 
the application layer [30]. 
 
4.1.13 Account Management Practices 
Having solid account management practices across the environment, for both elevated and non-
elevated accounts, provides another layer of fundamental protection against potential negative 
impacts. Throughout the recommendations presented earlier in this document, several best 
practices were discussed, such as changing default accounts/credentials, maintaining a secured 
asset inventory of highly sensitive credentials, deploying multi-factor authentication, etc. There 
are additional protections, which should be examined and considered for use; these include but are 
not limited to: 
• For administrative tasks requiring elevated credentials, provision different elevated 
accounts for different environments. For example, an elevated account used to administer 
network devices (e.g. firewalls, routers, etc.) should be an entirely different account than 
the one that is used to administer servers. Separating what each elevated account has access 
to reduces the threat surface should one of the elevated accounts be compromised. It should 
be noted that this is all predicated on the assumption that the individuals with these elevated 
credentials create separate and unique passwords for each account. Sharing the same 
password reduces the effectiveness of the intended separation. 
• Where possible, systems and applications should be configured to require complex 
passwords for elevated accounts. Complexity should include a minimum of 15 characters, 
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upper case, lower case, special characters and numbers. Increasing the permutations of 
possible character combinations significantly decreases the likelihood that elevated 
credentials can be compromised by brute force methods. 
• When new accounts are generated, ensure that passwords are created using a password 
randomization tool, and the account is placed into a state where the password must be 
changed upon first use. 
• Where possible, have all successful and unsuccessful login attempts be captured by an 
SIEM so that log correlation and analysis can occur. Provisioning a SIEM in any 
environment is not an advanced capability; however, using technologies such as user 
behavioral analysis (UBA) tools are. UBA toolsets provide the capability to analyze 
disparate sets of logs in order to determine if tasks are being executed that are abnormal to 
the typical behaviors of the individual (e.g. logging in from another country, logging in in 
at an abnormal time, etc.). 
 
4.1.14 Data and Systems Backup 
Backing up of data, applications and configurations within a SCADA environment may not be a 
common practice. Organizations that do not have IT and OT integrated teams have a tendency 
higher potential to forget about the need to backup these critical systems. Additionally, due to the 
real-time nature of the SCADA systems, specialized software or practices may be needed in order 
to ensure that the state, data and configurations are properly backed up so that the data can be 
recovered should a need arise [24]. Along with ensuring that backups are being completed, it is 
important that other customary practices, such as backup quality validation and testing, occur on 
a regular basis to ensure that the backups work as designed, should they be needed to restore 
applications 
 
4.1.15 Organization/Personnel Posturing for IT and OT Success 
A notable similarity between IT and OT relates to managing risk. This is the necessary common 
ground that IT and OT teams should seek in order to improve risk posture and minimize risk that 
cannot be reasonably addressed. While risk comes in different forms, it is not assessed and 
mitigated on a consistent basis, nor is the risk strictly viewed from a cybersecurity lens. In order 
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to effectively manage all technology risk in an enterprise (IT, OT, IoT and safety where tech and 
physical intersect), a manufacturing organization should look to establish the role of a Digital Risk 
Officer (DRO). The DRO should be functionally separate from IT and plant management and 
should primarily be a business leader and specialist at engaging teams and effectively 
communicating in order to assess and eliminate/mitigate the technology risks within an 
organization. This person should not be a technologist; however, he/she should be able to fulfill 
the expectations detailed below and in Figure 18: 
• Work with executive management to determine acceptable levels of risk 
• Establish a governance framework; define roles, responsibilities and awareness thereof 
• Develop a security vision and strategy for the entire organization (IT and OT) 
• Establish and maintain the combined security program 
• Develop, manage and control the security policy framework 
 
 
Figure 18: Digital Risk Officer paradigm [58] 
 
By establishing a DRO within the organization, security is no longer an IT or an OT issue, it 
becomes an issue of managing digital risk from a business perspective. Handling the digital risk 
in this manner breaks down cultural barriers between the different organizations, and allows both 
to operate on neutral territory, working in the best interest of the organization. With the neutral, 
third party DRO in place, it is somewhat natural that he/she becomes an advocate for functional 
leaders and helps to navigate this evolving landscape. A sample representation of how the DRO 
fits into the organization with other executives/leaders is shown below in Figure 19. This person 
will need to be business minded when facing complex problems and will need to navigate the 
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politics of an organization to reduce the examined risk, regardless of which departments are 
impacted. 
 
Figure 19: Digital Risk Officer and enterprise alignment with other executive roles [58] 
 
4.1.16 Governance for IT and OT Success  
Aligning personnel across the organization with the combined IT/OT strategy is necessary before 
technology decisions are made. This is usually difficult because the stakeholders of IT and OT are 
different individuals in the organization and may view and accept risks differently, which in turn 
can create conflict between technical departments/individuals. This is another important example 
of where instituting a DRO can pay dividends.  
 
Clear governance will defuse conflict. Establishing a single governance body and associated 
processes will allow all interested parties to participate collaboratively in order to ensure the right 
decisions are being made and the risks (initial or residual) are acceptable to the organization. The 
benefits of a clear and well-understood governance model for the security of IT and OT include 
but are not limited to:  
• Establish Accountability, Responsibilities and Authority — The combined governance 
team should set the roles, responsibilities and authorities of all resources in the 
organization, regardless of whether it is in the IT or OT realm. This will reduce the number 
of conflicts and enable optimal resource use.  
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• Align Risk Tolerance — The single governance body should agree on a common risk 
tolerance for integrated IT/OT environments. 
• Act As The Steering IT/OT Security Committee — The single governance body should 
oversee the security program activities across the IT and OT landscapes. This facilitates 
the identification of duplicated effort, the optimization of security skills and the allocation 
of the security investment/budget based on risk to the organization. 
• Ensure That Business Objectives Are Properly Supported — By including senior business 
representatives with operational and financial accountability in the combined governance 
body, business goals will be included in the scope of the security program for both IT and 
OT. 
• Set The Overall Direction — The governance body should set the strategic direction for 
the security program, taking non-security-related topics into consideration where impacts 
are potentially detrimental to the security program. 
• Prioritize Security Activities Across IT And OT — The priorities for all security-related 
activities can be set across both domains. 
• Reconcile Periodic Conflicts — Typical conflicts that require negotiation include 
situations in which: 
o A resource owner believes he/she has a valid business reason for requesting 
exemption from an existing policy. 
o Different resource owners have different risk appetites for respective systems, even 
if these systems share hosting resources.  
o A business owner may be willing to accept a risk, but the risk exceeds the 
enterprise's risk tolerance. 
• Set and Agree Upon Responsibilities - Understanding that the stakes are high and that 
potential benefits are on the horizon, it is recommended that organizations clearly define 
and assign responsibilities. It is also recommended that organizations implement a 
responsibility and accountability structure, also known as a RACI matrix. In situations 
where ambiguity and complexity must be addressed, a well-defined RACI can provide 
clarity. It indicates which personnel or departments are responsible and accountable and 
which need to be consulted and informed. A sample RACI, can be found below. 
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Figure 20: Proposed sample IT/OT RACI  
 
Overall, as IT and OT continue to converge, organizations will need to pay special attention to 
these areas of concern and will need to leverage a defense-in-depth strategy with a risk aware, 
governance-based operating model. IT-based security controls in OT environments are not as 
straightforward to implement and maintain. Effective policies and procedures revolving around 
risk management, mitigating practices/controls, cybersecurity awareness, and security compliance 
 75 
 
assessments act as enablers to apply security controls from a standpoint of acceptable risk, 
prioritizing safety and reliability. 
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Chapter 5: Review of Selected Recommendations Which Have Been Implemented  
 
5.1 Introduction 
This section aims to select a subset of the recommendations identified in Chapter 4 and discuss the 
implementation of those recommendations as a means to share the results of those efforts and what 
was learned. In each subsequent section, we will review each subject matter area’s starting 
position, the technology / approach implemented and the outcomes of the completed effort. 
 
5.2  Firewalls 
The existing firewall architecture was a legacy installation, leveraging Cisco Adaptive Security 
Appliances to filter and restrict traffic based on source address, destination address and ports 
attempting to being accessed. The existing solution provided a fundamental level of protection, 
however, it was dated and improvements were desired in order to elevate our security posture, 
specifically as it related to application-aware capabilities. We evaluated a number of different 
vendor solutions and selected Palo Alto as our next solution for the enterprise and over a one year 
period, we replaced all legacy devices with Palo Alto firewalls. Some of the outcomes of the efforts 
are noted below. 
• Implementing these modern application-aware firewall rules in order to evaluate traffic at 
a higher level, increased visibility to application level security threats. As an example of 
the improved visibility, by doing this we were able to identify OT services leveraging 
HTTP (over port 80 and 8080) rules being used to exchange information in an unorthodox 
way. The legacy firewall technology was unable to identify this issue and was allowing the 
application to bypass the need for specific firewall rules as well as creating an unneeded 
security hole to the OT firewall zone. Once identified, this was addressed with the plant 
engineers and remediated with the third party system integrator. 
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• Third party support organizations, with the help of the plant engineers (shadow IT), had 
deployed a VPN concentrator to establish site-to-site connections between organizations 
to allow direct access into our environment over HTTPs. The Palo Alto firewalls were able 
to decrypt that traffic and identify it as a VPN tunnel, not just a persistent HTTPs 
connection. We were able to work with the plant engineers to cease that behavior and have 
that tunnel terminate on an IT managed Palo Alto firewall, thus eliminating an insecure 
and unmanaged backdoor connection. 
 
5.3  Network Segmentation 
At the beginning of the effort to improve network segmentation for the enterprise, the ICS 
environments were on the same network as other enterprise assets. Needless to say we had a long 
road ahead in order to improve the security posture; a number of advancements were implemented. 
• Segregating all OT devices from the enterprise network was the first task and the most 
laborious. A lack of a complete and up-to-date hardware asset inventory required a 
significant manual effort to be conducted to not only understand the role of the device on 
the network, but also identify if it participates in any way in manufacturing operations. All 
OT devices were placed within one firewall zone off of the Palo Alto firewall pair. After a 
few weeks of evaluating the traffic traversing the firewall zones in a listen only mode, we 
had enough information in order to implement the initial ruleset to restrict traffic as 
necessary while dropping all other traffic. This allowed us to reduce the threat surface for 
the OT environment by restricting access inbound / outbound for this segment. 
• With the environment segmented and the Palo Alto firewalls in place, leveraging the 
application aware capabilities, we began to understand more as it relates to the traffic 
patterns of our OT environment. By doing this we identified a number of improvements 
necessary to retain traffic within the manufacturing firewall zone. Some findings related to 
simple misconfigurations and others required services housed on shared servers to be split 
apart so that we could effectively segregate all traffic properly and prevent unnecessary 
traffic from traversing the firewall. 
• For the majority of our OT environment we segmented devices into one of two private 
community VLANs. The first contained devices that commonly did not require human 
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interaction (e.g. PLCs, sensors, etc.) and could be contained within the same community 
VLAN. All other OT devices, which commonly did require human interaction, such as 
HMIs, factory floor PCs, data historians, and other MES processes were placed into a 
second community VLAN. In order for devices to talk across communities, traffic exits to 
the promiscuous port which in our case is a layer 3 switch. We still have work to do in 
order to apply ACLs to restrict traffic further, however, the foundational pieces are in place 
so that when ready, we can begin evaluating traffic as needed. 
• For IT administration purposes, all IT admins have been provisioned a dedicated virtual 
server in a bastion host network. All IT / OT administration activities are to be performed 
from these dedicated virtual servers within our corporate data center. These virtual servers 
are themselves hardened and not allowed to access the internet, company email services as 
well as a handful of other controls to reduce the potential for compromise. Additionally, 
their assigned company laptop is no longer allowed to be used for any administrative 
activities; it is solely to be used for general, non-elevated business functions (e.g. email, 
internet access, etc.). This set of changes was not well received by the IT staff as we were 
modifying how each administrator conducted their day-to-day duties. Despite it being an 
unwelcomed requirement, the complaints have subsided and we have even identified 
opportunities for further improvement in tangential areas of interest (e.g. script repositories 
for common administrative tasks). 
 
These changes have been implemented for a subset of the enterprise where the greatest risk to 
human safety and our intellectual property exists. We’ve focused on a small number of pilot sites 
in order to operationalize the thinking, approach and implementation plan prior to rolling this out 
across the enterprise globally. This effort was conducted hand-in-hand with the site leadership, 
with detailed planning and organizational change management along the way. 
 
5.4  Asset Inventory / Management 
At the beginning of our asset management journey, there was no asset inventory other than 
outdated, ad-hoc spreadsheets to denote what PCs had been assigned to which employees. As an 
asset management strategy was assembled, it was decided to focus on software asset management 
 79 
 
first and address hardware asset management once network segmentation was properly 
implemented so that we could leverage the capabilities of NAC and Cisco industrial network 
director to identify and fingerprint all network connected devices. 
 
The first step to introduce software asset management to the organization consisted of evaluating 
and selecting a toolset to act as a software entitlement reconciliation engine to inventory and assess 
our landscape of installed software. After careful analysis and evaluation we selected Snow 
Software for this task. With this SaaS solution we installed agents on every PC and server in the 
enterprise globally. The inventory information as well as statistics related to frequency of software 
usage, software signatures, location, MAC & IP addresses as well as a plethora of other associated 
metadata are synchronized to their cloud services and made available for our use. Some of the 
other important benefits of implementing the solution include but are not limited to: 
• Ability to gain visibility to the software install base for specific application packages. This 
becomes useful to determine which PCs have OT related software installed so that 
additional investigation can be performed (e.g. hardening, identifying users with access to 
OT, etc.). 
• In conjunction with application whitelisting efforts, the database which gets created as a 
result the software inventory and reconciliation process is a useful tool in order to assess 
any newly identified software blocked by Carbon Black. While these two tools are not 
integrated, the Snow license entitlement engine acts as a useful resource for manual 
assessment related to information on the software publisher, installation information, 
licensing status, scope of usage by location/department, etc. to compare against. 
• Through the Snow engine, we are able to identify cracked and potentially malicious 
software in the environment. This has allowed our asset management resources to 
investigate, and work with the networking team to place the asset in quarantine while the 
root cause and corrective actions are instituted. 
 
The one constraint we faced when deploying this solution was that we underestimated the potential 
risk relating to General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Given that this is a cloud solution 
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and information could be gleaned from the service which could be used to infer an employee’s 
productivity (e.g. the frequency to which applications are executed), we needed to work with our 
German data privacy officer in order to demonstrate how this information would be used, who has 
access to this data as well as the cyber protections that have been implemented to protect this data. 
Upon proceeding through the formal process for GDPR compliance we were granted approval to 
continue execution of the project. 
 
5.5  ICS Device & OT PC Hardening 
At the beginning of this effort, the existing environment did not have any OT devices hardened. 
Many of these devices were implemented out of the box and never properly configured prior to 
deployment. As we progressed in our analysis, as identified a theme that OT machinery vendors 
typically implemented the devices ensuring that the equipment was unencumbered in any way 
from potentially having operational issues in conjunction with the rest of the environment. 
 
Relating to ICS devices, once I was able to separate the OT environment from the rest of the 
enterprise network, the first action taken was to use Nessus, a vulnerability scanning tool, to 
perform a port scan in listening mode, in order to understand what ports and protocols were being 
leveraged across the OT networks. Conducting the port scan in listen mode prevented any issues 
related to Nessus attempting to assess vulnerability compliance, thus potentially knocking some 
sensitive OT devices off of the network. Once this was completed, the results were examined and 
assessed against the newly devised software asset management database and environment 
architecture diagrams (outdated but useful to understand the OT architecture). Once the assessment 
was complete, we were able to identify a number of problems, including but not limited to: 
• Unnecessary and redundant services running in the environment, such as DHCP. To 
remediate we shut off those services and leveraged singular IT managed services where 
available. 
• Many devices were configured to listen on multiple services such as HTTP, HTTPs, FTP, 
Telnet, SSH, etc. Upon further investigation, it was determined that most of the devices 
only needed one of these to be active. Where possible, the secured version of the protocol 
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was selected (SSH over TELNET,  HTTPS over HTTP) and the other unnecessary 
protocols were disabled. 
• It was determined that many of the devices were configured to be logged into using default 
administrator credentials. As part of the remediation effort, credentials were streamlined 
where possible to limit access, create complex password strings, secure shared credentials 
in a PAM tool and where possible, ensure plant engineers had individual accounts to login 
to the devices rather than using shared credentials. 
 
The effort to harden the ICS device footprint was initially met with resistance and concern. The 
project was executed with executive sponsor approval and done so in a manner where the plant 
engineers were side-by-side with the IT engineers and third party vendors every step of the way. 
At the conclusion of this effort, all parties were satisfied, with no unplanned downtime or negative 
consequences otherwise. Additionally, as a by-product of these efforts to port scan the 
environments looking for unnecessary services, we were able to make material improvements to 
our vulnerability management practices. 
 
Specific to the Windows PCs which operate in the OT environment, a number of different actions 
were taken in order to harden those devices. They include but are not limited to: 
• Creation of a set of Windows 7 and Windows 10 operating system images solely to be used 
for OT PCs. This image was hardened by removing unnecessary services, applications and 
applying numerous registry edits to limit the threat surface. 
• All internet access from these PCs was removed other than those destinations necessary to 
perform their job function (supplier portals, timecard services, payroll, etc.).  
• In order to login to the OT PC, plant operators were required to login with multi-factor 
authentication using a combination of Duo Security SaaS software and Yubikey hardware. 
• All removable media was restricted from use. Access was only granted on an exception 
basis, for a specific individual and time period. Business justification, manager approval 
and security operations center review are all required in order to gain exception approval. 
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• Application whitelisting was implemented leveraging the Carbon Black suite for endpoint 
protection. To begin, agents were installed on all OT PCs and servers in low-enforcement 
mode. While in low-enforcement mode, the agent fingerprints the PC or server to 
understand what applications are executed in order to build a “white list” of known good 
executables. This was performed for about three months at which point in time the 
environment was slowly migrated to high-enforcement mode. When in high-enforcement 
mode, when ay software is attempted to be executed, the agent checks to see if it is a known 
good application in the “white list”. If found in the list, the execution is allowed; if not 
found, the execution is blocked with user asked to provide context to the action (if they 
were aware) or to deny that anything was executed (potentially malware). 
 
At the completion of the Windows hardening efforts the majority of the implemented controls were 
still in place with only a few changes. 
• The multi-factor authentication requirements needed to be revised for some sensitive OT 
PCs which required a shared account to be used to execute a legacy manufacturing 
application. Having multi-factor authentication enabled was preventing the process from 
automatically starting. Over time, various other processes needed to be exempted for 
similar reasons but the majority of the environment is still protected. 
• A few key plant engineers required perpetual removable media exceptions in order to 
obtain diagnostic data from the OT PCs. This was allowed as the alternative would have 
required the PCs to be able to upload their data to an internet hosted cloud service. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
6.1 Summary 
15 to 20 years ago, a robust cybersecurity posture for a manufacturing company most likely meant 
that the company patched Windows devices, had implemented firewalls at the edge and had other 
protection-based services for the enterprise network, leaving the OT environment untouched, and 
in many cases, unprotected. The days of fundamental protections and turning a blind eye to the 
manufacturing network are no longer. Technology is much more complex, threats have 
significantly advanced and attack methods are specialized, targeted and persistent. 
 
The evolution of smart manufacturing is on the rise and organizations are beginning to pay 
attention to the compelling benefits for customers and the bottom line. As organizations look to 
achieve the benefits of SM, it is crucial to also look at the manufacturing organization’s security 
posture in a focused and deliberate manner. Otherwise, organizations will not only fail to realize 
the benefits of SM, but more importantly, will potentially introduce a new array of security 
vulnerabilities and threats. Organizations must perform the fundamentals to prevent, detect and 
mitigate risks to the manufacturing environment, whether the risks currently exist or are introduced 
via an effort to drive SM adoption. Inability to implement a reasonable and prudent defense-in-
depth strategy will introduce new risks, some of which will be unlike anything previously seen by 
the IT/OT support organization(s). Manufacturing leaders need to assume a breach, work to 
mitigate risks and take a proactive cybersecurity stance to protect customers, and more 
importantly, the safety of employees. 
 
6.2 Future Research 
Smart manufacturing is quickly evolving. Technology is rapidly augmenting as new concepts and 
use cases are developed by manufacturing organizations and the possibility of a “connected 
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factory” provides new and exciting insights, daily. Given this evolving backdrop, there are several 
topics that can be explored beyond this research. Further research topics include but are not limited 
to: 
• Cloud Manufacturing Operations – Cloud-based ICS/SCADA services are being 
introduced to integrate and manage factory floor operations. How it affects the 
traditionally staunch and slow-to-adopt mentality and investment cycle of the 
manufacturing vertical could be game changing. 
• Encryption in ICS Environments – The state of encryption across the factory floor, and 
how devices currently do/do not securely communicate across the LAN and WAN could 
be investigated, along with cipher strength capabilities and limitations. 
• Technology Leapfrogging – Given the established nature of manufacturing technology, 
opportunities for companies to strategically delay investments as SM becomes more 
mainstream could be investigated in order to leverage the advantages of being a late 
adopter. 
• Software Defined Everything – How the software defined paradigm of everything, from 
firewalls to controllers, impacts manufacturing security operations, as well as OT. 
• Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) – The impacts of BYOD on a manufacturing operation, 
the risks and control issues. 
• Boundary Defense – Additional boundary defense protections could be investigated, 
which could be specific to OT environments in order to quarantine/defend from external 
and enterprise-focused attacks. 
• Smart Manufacturing Standards – The vast array of authoritative bodies (ISO, IEC, NIST, 
country sponsored initiatives, etc.) could be assessed, focusing on where there is overlap, 
consensus and lack of agreement. Additionally, specific research could be conducted 
regarding the lack of U.S. involvement as a nation in driving SM and Industry 4.0 from 
the top down (government), as compared to other countries (e.g. Germany with Industrie 
4.0, China with its China 2025 initiative). 
• AI for Manufacturing – The potential cybersecurity concerns associated with adopting AI 
and ML within manufacturing environments deserves further consideration.  
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• Data Privacy – The issues that exist relating to the manufacturing industry, both from a 
product creation perspective and the services portion of produced goods. Some products 
create and store data, potentially accessible by the manufacturer, so global government 
regulation (e.g. GDPR) should be analyzed as it affects the cybersecurity of the end user. 
• Block chain – The application of block chain to manufacturing processes in order to 
manage cyber-risk.  
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